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1Abstract
Economic Indicators and Social Networks:
New approaches to measuring poverty, prices, and impacts of technology
by
Niall Carrigan Keleher
Doctor of Philosophy in Information Management and Systems
University of California, Berkeley
Dr. Joshua Evan Blumenstock, Chair
Collecting data to inform policy decisions is an ongoing global challenge. While some data
collection has become routine, certain populations remain dicult to reach. From targeting social
protection programs in densely-populated urban areas to reaching the “last mile” of infrastructure
coverage, data collection and service delivery go hand-in-hand. Understanding the populations
that live in urban communities as well as remote villages can help to tailor the design, targeting,
and implementation of development programs. New sources of information have the potential to
improve awareness of the needs and preferences of individuals, households, and communities.
The goal of this dissertation is to provide multiple vantage points on the role that data, commu-
nity input, and individual preferences can play in informing development policy. The empirical
investigation presented in this dissertation covers two studies in Liberia and one in the Philippines.
The unifying theme of the three chapters is the exploration of new sources of information about
hard-to-reach populations.
In the rst chapter, I seek to describe and explain how community members would prefer to
see a cash grant program targeted. Cash grant programs are widely popular. However, target-
ing of these, as well as other social protection programs in densely-populated urban areas, is a
challenging undertaking. I take a rst principal’s approach to assessing individual preferences
for targeting. I nd that individuals express a clear preference for selecting community members
that are similar to themselves. This holds true in the rst stage of the study when I asked people
to nominate knowledgeable community members to target a social protection program. It also
holds true when I asked community members to target a cash grant. The presence of homophily,
widely observed in social networks, is an important factor to consider when leveraging private
information from individuals.
In the second chapter, I present an empirical analysis of the determinants of cellular network
adoption in the context of community cellular networks. The networks were installed in seven
remote locations of the Philippines. Prior to the study, these locations had been overlooked by
mobile network operators thus did not have reliable mobile phone service. I leverage a unique
scenario where rich socio-economic data were collected prior to the installation of the cellular
2networks. Using this data, I examine demographics, economic welfare, and access to information
prior to network launch. To examine determinants of network adoption, I present an empirical
investigation of the household characteristics that correlate with cellular network adoption on the
extensive (any usage) and intensive margins (volume of calls and texts). I nd that wealth is a key
driver of network usage. Social network position, however, does not appear to inuence cellular
network usage. Taken together, the ndings of Chapter Two present encouraging evidence for the
potential for cellular networks in remote localities as well as a cautionary tale of the potential for
cellular networks to advantage wealthy households via greater access to outside social networks.
The third chapter focuses on another angle of understanding hard to reach communities.
The challenge of collecting high-quality, timely data on prices is at the forefront of assessing
and responding to microeconomic and macroeconomic conditions throughout the world. By
using high-frequency data collected through a mobile application, I analyze tens of thousands
of individual price observations collected at hundreds of locations in Monrovia, Liberia. I show
that these data can be used to construct composite market indices that mirror government price
indices.
As a whole, the chapters of this dissertation are intended to push the edges of how researchers
and policymakers approach the understanding of social networks and economic indicators in
urban and rural localities.
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1Introduction
Hard-to-reach populations often go unnoticed. This is especially true for the poor. Governments
and NGOs face increasing challenges of identifying poor households in rapidly expanding urban
slums. Global eorts to expand cellular and internet coverage grow increasingly dicult as the
hardest-to-reach are the last to remain without connectivity. Building reliable economic indicators
and statistics is also a challenge of access. Whether or not it is service delivery, infrastructure de-
velopment, or government statistics, diculty in reaching populations and obtaining information
for policy decisionmaking is likely to be a persistent challenge for decades to come.
The challenge of collecting data that sheds light on hard-to-reach populations is one that
I approach with great passion and urgency. I approach my research as a task to shed light on
often-overlooked populations and ideas. Running through my research are the themes of social
networks, economic indicators, and the design of development programs. I believe that more
insights into the role that social networks play in economic behaviors will help researchers and
policymakers to understand the interconnectedness of local communities as well as the potential
for expanded connectivity. I believe that more insights into economic wellbeing not only document
where things stand today but also help to focus priorities going forward.
As decisionmaking in economic and social development policy becomes more and more reliant
on data, the excitement of new data sources is palpable. Nevertheless, the opinions of people,
the constraints on households, and the limitations of various data sources should be taken into
account.
This dissertation is intended to document and expound upon contexts where hard-to-reach
populations are at the core of the policy problem. In the rst chapter, I seek to describe and
explain how community members would prefer to see a cash grant program targeted in Monrovia,
Liberia. Cash grant programs are widely popular. However, targeting of these, as well as other
social protection programs in densely-populated urban areas, is a challenging undertaking. In the
second chapter, I present an empirical analysis of the determinants of cellular network adoption
in the context of community cellular networks. The networks were installed in seven remote
locations of the Philippines. Prior to the study, these locations had been overlooked by mobile
network operators thus did not have reliable mobile phone service. The third chapter focuses
on another angle of understanding hard to reach communities. The challenge of collecting high-
quality, timely data on prices is at the forefront of assessing and responding to microeconomic
and macroeconomic conditions throughout the world. I focus on urban locations in Monrovia,
Liberia where collecting price data is particularly dicult.
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In working on the research discussed in the chapters of this dissertation, I designed survey
instruments to measure social network indicators in Monrovia and the Philippines. Taken together
with survey modules on economic wellbeing and activity, I, along with colleagues, collected high-
quality data that shed light on the relationship between social network position and economic
wellbeing. Through descriptive analysis, I provide information about how economic poverty and
social connectedness correlate. Often, I nd that social connectedness is negatively correlated
with economic welfare. That is, when we look at local social networks, the poor are well connected.
This suggests the potential to leverage social connections. In the rst chapter, I seek to test ways
of leveraging social ties for targeting a cash grant. I nd that individuals are able to identify
poor households that they are socially connected to; however, the quality of information is biased
towards over-estimating poverty of nearest neighbors. In the second chapter, I examine whether
or not introducing a cellular network advantages those that are wealthy or those that are socially
connected. I nd that cellular networks may advantage the wealthy who were more likely to use
the cellular network.
My research also leverages new sources of data. I have had the privilege of working with great
colleagues, mentors, and collaborators on call detail records and high-frequency data collected
through mobile phone applications. In the second chapter, I present analysis that relies heavily
on call detail records from community cellular networks in the Philippines. In the third chapter,
I include analysis of price data collected through a mobile phone application. The availability
of these data makes detailed, temporal analysis possible. At the same time, approaching the
data with humility and skepticism requires one to compare and contrast multiple sources of data.
Throughout this dissertation, I seek to present data from multiple sources and contexts to help
validate or invalidate what I nd through new sources of data.
3Chapter One
Targeting by Nomination
How homophily aects targeting of social
programs
Abstract
Targeting beneciaries for social programs in urban areas is increasingly important as urban pop-
ulations grow. Many anticipate that poverty and emergency relief programs will become more
prevalent in densely populated settings. However, current targeting strategies and tools may not
be suited for dynamic urban environments. We provide evidence and recommendations for iden-
tifying beneciary households/individuals for social programs in urban areas. We implemented a
decentralized targeting mechanism through socially-knowledgeable members of urban neighbor-
hoods of Monrovia, Liberia. We leveraged information from various types of community members
to target an antipoverty program. The program implemented was a one-time unconditional cash
grant to households. We sought to verify whether or not decentralized targeting of the uncondi-
tional cash grant is eective in reaching poor households and households that have experienced
an economic or health shock. We nd that community members are likely to recommend others
with similar characteristics as knowledgeable agents and as ideal beneciaries for the cash grant
program. The presence of homophily in targeting preference is a key consideration that should
be taken into account when eliciting information from community members. When asked about
the welfare status of other households, agents provide accurate information for neighbors with
whom they are socially connected.†
†The material in this chapter is based on joint work with Lori Beaman and Jeremy Magruder. Innovations for
Poverty Action conducted the data collection and project management in Liberia.
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1.1 Introduction
Eective targeting of beneciaries for social programs, i.e., enrolling those who would benet the
most into any given social service or program, is a challenge around the world. In Sub-Saharan
Africa and other nations in the Global South, targeting through existing social infrastructures,
such as village chiefs and councils, and proxy means tests have become standard “best practices.”
However, as populations shift to dynamic urban environments, these strategies may no longer
best address targeting needs. Social infrastructure may be more uid or break down entirely and
leaders may be less informed about their populace.
Targeting beneciaries for social programs in urban areas is increasingly important as urban
populations grow and poverty or emergency relief programs become more common in densely
populated settings. Tools for targeting social programs in rural settings often leverage pre-existing
social and political institutions to target beneciaries. Without a better understanding of the
social environment of urban areas, the eectiveness of community knowledge may break down
in shifting, urban environments.
This paper aims to provide evidence and recommendations for identifying beneciary house-
holds/individuals for social programs in urban areas. We implemented a decentralized target-
ing mechanism through socially-knowledgeable members of urban neighborhoods of Monrovia,
Liberia. In doing so, we take a networks-based approach to targeting a social program. We seek to
provide evidence to verify whether leveraging social connections leads to dierential beneciary
selection.
Through an innovative, decentralized mechanism for reaching program beneciaries, we
investigated the channels through which needy households can be targeted for a social program.
By collecting detailed and high-quality information at multiple stages of the study, we set out to
examine whether decentralized targeting mechanism can be used more widely to leverage local
community knowledge for identifying (a) key informants and (b) beneciaries for social programs.
First, we elicited nominations from all households to identify socially-knowledgeable commu-
nity members. Then, we leverage information from various types of community members to target
an antipoverty program. The program implemented was a one-time cash grant to households.
For the cash grant, we sought to verify whether or not this decentralized targeting of the cash
grant is eective in reaching poor households and households that have experienced an economic
or health shock and whether the decentralized targeting mechanism identies households with a
high return to the cash grant.
In designing this study, we worked with a sub-section of the Ministry of Gender, Children and
Social Protection (MoGCSP), commonly called the “social protections pillar.” This pillar has over-
seen several large-scale cash transfer programs that included monitoring components. UNICEF
implemented the rst large-scale unconditional cash transfer program in Bomi county. Beginning
in 2009, it nished and completed a nal evaluation in 2015, right as Ebola hit the nation.
A great deal of policy attention has shifted towards cash transfer programs, both in Liberia
and internationally. Conversations with government agencies and donors active in Monrovia
after the Ebola crisis suggest that cash transfers are an increasingly relevant policy option. The
United Nations is currently implementing a cash transfer program in the country. Mercy Corps
CHAPTER 1. LEVERAGING SOCIAL CONNECTIONS 5
has expressed interest in reaching those directly aected by the Ebola crisis. GiveDirectly has es-
tablished an oce in Liberia. DFID has recently convened a panel on humanitarian cash transfers,
suggesting that the timing for this project is very appropriate for testing variations of cash trans-
fer programs after a humanitarian crisis. Nevertheless, little work has been focused on targeting
of cash transfers in urban areas. As such, we feel that this research is timely and important to
understanding how social programs—like cash transfers—can be designed, beneciaries targeted,
and cash delivered in urban locations.
At least 15 NGOs initiated unconditional cash transfer programs after the Ebola crisis. As the
crisis ended, these cash transfer programs were brought to an end with no long-term replacement
or policy solution. However, the emergency-response cash transfer programs provided valuable
insight to the government about both cash transfer program’s potential and challenges. These
previous programs also established an experienced cash transfer apparatus within the government.
The MoGCSP is actively planning for implementation of a large-scale cash transfer program that
will build on top of the lessons from the UNICEF program. While the geographic focus of the
program will be rural, the MoGCSP has expressed a desire to tackle challenges of social protection
within urban areas of Liberia. Additionally, GiveDirectly is beginning to plan for urban cash
transfer programs (initially in Kenya).
1.2 Social Networks and Targeting
Traditional community-based targeting methods are manifest through two primary mechanisms.
Community members are called to meet in a central location to deliberate who should be included
in a particular social protection program. Communities may identify beneciaries to receive
direct benets while also enforcing some form of social insurance through which benets are
shared. Alternatively, or sometimes in tandem with community meetings, local leaders are asked
to select beneciaries. Where local leaders have an inordinate amount of discretion, idiosyncratic
targeting of benets may result. Community meetings have the benet of transparency and
inclusiveness. All members of the community are invited to the meeting. Such meetings require
considerable coordination. Group decisions are not immune to capture by vociferous members
of the community. Idiosyncrasies of community-based targeting can lead to dierences dening
who should be considered poor and eligible for social protection programs.
In most countries where cash transfers are implemented, proxy means tests are the primary
method for targeting cash transfer beneciaries (e.g., Fernald, Gertler, and Neufeld (2008) and
Fiszbein and Schady (2009)). Rai (2002) presented early evidence of the role that community
information plays in targeting social programs. Alatas, Banerjee, Hanna, et al. (2012) conduct
an experiment in 640 Indonesian hamlets to compare targeting outcomes of community-based,
proxy-means, and hybrid targeting schemes. They nd that targeting through a proxy means test
reduces error rates (combined errors of inclusion and exclusion). However, the dierence in error
rates does not fundamentally change the eect of the social protection program on poverty rates.
Moreover, they nd that communities view community-based targeting as more legitimate and
transparent than the proxy-means test.
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In a experiment that targeted a cash transfer program in Niger, Premand and Schnitzer (2018)
compare three primary targeting methods: (1) Community-based targeting (CBT), (2) Proxy-
means Tests (PMT), and (3) a food-insecurity metric (FCS). The authors nd that PMT is more
likely than the other two methods to direct program benets to consumption-poor households.
However, the methods are indistinguishable in targeting household based on assets, income,
and subjective well-being. Legitimacy and perceived accuracy across the three methods were
equivalent.
In a non-experimental study Basurto, Dupas, and Robinson (2017) show that community
leaders in Malawi are prone to more errors in targeting relative to a PMT. Nevertheless, the social
benet of the program is enhanced by the local leaders by directing benets to high-productivity
households. Through an experiment in Zambia, Schüring (2014) nd that individuals charged
with the responsibility of determining cash transfer beneciaries are no more likely to give to
close relatives. Niehaus et al. (2013) caution that targeting through a proxy means test can be
problematic when those charged with verifying the proxy means are corruptible.
This paper ts in with a broad literature on how targeting through specic individuals within
a community alters the distribution of benets. Identifying important nodes within a network is
an important topic of research within the eld of social and economic networks. Adamic and Adar
(2005) discuss methods of searching a social network to identify specic nodes within the network.
They test search strategies driven by high-degree individuals (people that communicate with many
others are more likely to know target nodes), individuals with similar characteristics as the target
nodes, and geographic proximity to the target nodes. Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou
(2006) posit that power, or as they term it “intercentrality,” denes key nodes within a network.
The importance of nodes is not only determined by their centrality but also by how much they
alter the centrality of their neighbors. Relevant to community-based targeting, Fafchamps and
Labonne (2019) show that benets of a decentralized social protection program in the Philippines
were more likely to go to households with high betweenness centrality, suggesting that benets
are used to form coalitions for electoral support.
This paper seeks to contribute to empirical evidence of the importance of homophily in eco-
nomic behavior. By taking advantage of network structure for more ecient forms of search
within a network, this paper builds o of fundamental contributions from Milgram (1967), Klein-
berg (2000), and Watts, Dodds, and Newman (2002). These seminal works provide inspiration for
ecient search strategies that leverage social connections and sub-graph clustering. Golub and
Jackson (2012) present model that explains the importance of homophily in producing correct,
aggregate information. Bloch and Olckers (2018) point to the importance of network structure in
the ability to target in networks. They suggest that in the absence of complete ordinal rankings,
incentive-compatible and ecient targeting mechanisms are possible when social networks are
bipartite or dened by a triangle. Galeotti, Golub, and Goyal (2017) show that strategic behavior
is important when targeting in networks. Baumann (2016) presents a valuable mechanism design
for our paper in seeking to target a “prize” to the most valued node in a network.
Much of the research on the importance of social networks concentrate on the spread of behav-
ior within the network (See Kitsak et al. (2010) and Aral and Walker (2012)). Within development
economics, several studies have investigated the role of key nodes in the adoption of agricultural
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technologies (Beaman et al. 2018; T. G. Conley and C. R. Udry 2010; T. Conley and C. Udry 2001)
and insurance (Cai, De Janvry, and Sadoulet 2015).
Most closely connected to this paper are a handful of studies that examine how network
position inuences targeted social protection programs. Banerjee et al. (2014) demonstrate that
residents of 35 villages in India were able to identify highly central people in their community.
The authors asked people to nominate others to help spread information about a loan product
or an entertainment event. Banerjee et al. (2014) show that individuals that are nominated and
leaders in their community are also highly central in the social network.
Alatas, Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, et al. (2016) surveyed nine households in each of 631 villages
in Indonesia to assess the welfare of other households within the same community. Surveyed
individuals were asked to rank their household and the other eight surveyed households based
on household wealth. The researchers use survey data to quantify the actual wealth ranking
of households, as measured through a 28-question proxy means test and a self-assessed welfare
question. They also collected social network data to identify connections within the community.
The authors show that the quality of the assessment deteriorates with social distance. Nevertheless,
the authors show that knowledge of community members is relatively ecient in identifying poor
households when compared to a proxy means test.
Utilizing social network data, Kim et al. (2015) test three dierent targeting methods to encour-
age adoption of multivitamins and a water purication treatment in 32 Honduran villages. In one
set of villages, randomly-selected individuals were provided a health product (either multivitamins
or water purication treatment). In the second group of villages, individuals with the highest
in-degree centrality, as measured through a social network census, were approached for the health
intervention. Finally, a third group was identied by asking members of the randomly-selected
individuals to nominate a friend to receive the health product. The researcher then tracked pur-
chased of the health products to assess which means of targeting led to the highest adoption rates.
The researchers found that the most eective means of targeting the multivitamin supplement
was the nominated-friends method. High-degree individuals were no more eective than random
members of the community in promoting the adoption of the health products. The adoption rates
of the water purication treatment were indistinguishable across the three targeting methods.
(Also see Vera-Cossio (2017) and Shakya et al. (2017) for similar analysis in the same context.)
In a highly-relevant study by Hussam, Rigol, and Roth (2018), examine how well community
members predict the marginal returns to capital of their neighbors. In an experiment with 1,345
entrepreneurs, the authors asked individual entrepreneurs to rank four to six other entrepreneurs
within their neighborhood on predicted marginal returns to capital. Following personal inter-
views, the researchers distributed USD$100 grants to one-third of entrepreneurs. They nd that
entrepreneurs that are predicted to be high-performing yield two to three times the return to
capital as the average entrepreneur.
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1.3 Research Design and Data
We generated rich data sources on household welfare and social connections within 13 densely-
populated neighborhoods in Monrovia. The study entailed ve stages. First, we canvased thirteen
neighborhoods in three selected communities of Monrovia. A team of surveyors from Innovations
for Poverty Action (IPA) conducted a household listing of 2,656 households. We successfully
completed 2,434 listing surveys (92% survey rate) in which all adult members of each household
were listed through a household roster. Second, we returned to each household within a two-week
period to conduct a comprehensive socio-economic baseline survey with heads of households or
their partner. We completed 2,253 household surveys. Thus, we have baseline information on
socio-economic information for 85% of households in the study area. The listing and baseline
surveys were conducted between February and April 2018 (See Figure A.1.1 for the full project
timeline). Third, we invited individuals from a fteen-percent sample of households to participate
in a “Targeting Survey” to assess knowledge of the welfare of households in each community as
well as elicit nominations for a cash grant program. Fourth, IPA attempted to deliver a USD$80
cash grant to 280 households. Finally, we carried out an endline survey of the targeted cash grant
beneciaries as well as a matched-pair control household.
Baseline survey and social network census
Table 1.1 displays the number of households identied in each of the 13 blocks and the propor-
tion of households surveyed in the household listing. The size of blocks ranges from 73 to 408
households (mean 204, s.d. 95.2). Survey completion rates for the baseline ranged from 78.1% to
91.2%. In eleven out of the thirteen blocks, we managed to complete a baseline survey with over
80% of households. As such, we believe that the baseline data provides a near-comprehensive
perspective of household-level economic conditions and social networks within the 13 community
blocks identied for the Leveraging Social Connections study.
The baseline survey included questions about subjective well-being, household expenditures,
assets ownership, health and economic shocks in the past 12 months, and inter-household social
interactions (i.e. a social network survey). From the asset information, we are able to calculate a
standard proxy means score that mirrors the Poverty Probability Index and the Government of
Liberia’s PMT.
Among a ten-percent sample of households, we conducted a full household expenditures
module. This module mirrored the expenditure module used by the Liberian central statistical
oce, LISGIS, in the 2014–15 Household Income and Economic Survey (HIES).1 We carried out the
full HIES expenditure module in order to assess and calibrate a reduced-length (“simple module”)
household expenditure module which was conducted among 100% of households in the baseline
survey.
Through a social network census, we took painstaking eorts to identify intra-block social
ties, even if a connected household was not available for the baseline survey. Our goal was to
1Survey instruments accessed from http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/2563/
study-description.
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Table 1.1: Count of Households by Neighborhood
Neighborhood Households Surveyed households Adults listed Prop. surveyed at baseline
C1 150 127 361 0.847
C2 251 222 536 0.884
C3 321 253 638 0.788
L1 408 372 1118 0.912
L2 227 186 514 0.819
L3 133 109 299 0.820
L4 190 160 351 0.842
W1 303 248 678 0.818
W2 190 160 401 0.842
W3 102 89 227 0.873
W4 159 138 361 0.868
W5 73 57 166 0.781
W6 149 132 347 0.886
identify current and meaningful social ties between surveyed household and other households
within the community. With our full baseline sample, we elicited social network connections
using the following question:
For the next questions I ask you, the answer can only be people who live in this same
block with you.
They also must be older than 18. I will ask you to name the 5 people to answer my
question.
Who did you spend time with the most because you wanted to spend time with them, in
the last 14 days?
We asked respondents to name up to ve social ties within the community. Using this method,
we successfully identied a total of 7,603 social ties within the 13 study blocks. The social network
data allow us to perform detailed social network analysis within each block. In addition, we are
able to compute measures of social network centrality for each household.
Nomination of knowledgeable community members
During the baseline interview, we asked each survey respondent to nominate one member of their
community to assist with targeting a social assistance program. We elicited community member
nominations by one of the following questions:
1. If we want to spread information about a social assistance program, to whom do you suggest
we speak?
CHAPTER 1. LEVERAGING SOCIAL CONNECTIONS 10
2. If we want to identify which people would be best to help us identify which people in this block
would benet most from a social assistance program, to whom do you suggest we speak?
3. If we want to identify which people would be best to help us identify which people in this block
would benet most from a cash gift for social assistance, to whom do you suggest we speak?
For each baseline respondent, we randomly selected one of the three questions listed above.
The purpose of randomizing the elicitation questions is to quantify the extent to which nomi-
nations are inuenced by the potential of a cash grant or other social assistance. 92 percent of
households provided a nomination for the targeting assistance.
Targeting assistant survey
After the household census, we invited individual community members to complete a one-on-
one interview with an IPA sta member. Invited community members were drawn from 15
percent of households interviewed in the household census. We refer to the individuals invited
for one-on-one meetings as “Targeting Assistants” (TAs) as they were asked to provide input to
help determine how the unconditional cash grant would be distributed among households living
within the community block. We refer to the one-on-one interview as a “targeting survey” as the
interview aims to elicit the beliefs and preferences of the Targeting Assistants.
TAs were selected through one of three methods. Households with the greatest number of
nominations from baseline respondents were included as “Nominated TAs”. We also invited
leaders from the neighborhood as “Leader TAs”. Finally, “Random TAs” were drawn randomly
from adults within the neighborhood. In total, 394 TAs participated in the targeting survey. More
than three-quarters of TAs were under the age of 45. The average age of randomly selected TAs
(32.6 years) was lower than the average age of the nominated TAs (40 years). Gender split of
random and nominated TAs was the same; 53 percent of all TAs were women.
Table 1.2: TA Types
All Un-Nominated Nominated
p-value
N=394 N=140 N=254
TA is female 0.53 (0.50) 0.54 (0.50) 0.52 (0.50) 0.715
Number of block members for TA Survey 30.9 (6.05) 30.8 (5.81) 30.9 (6.19) 0.801
TA understood the targeting survey 0.95 (0.23) 0.94 (0.25) 0.95 (0.21) 0.496
We randomized the way in which the targeting survey was introduced. One of the following
two paragraphs was randomly selected to be read to the targeting assistant:
Poverty Framing (Option A): The goal of this program is to reach the poorest house-
holds in this community. We would like to request your assistance in deciding how to
reach the poorest households in this community.
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OR
Shocks Framing (Option B): The goal of this program is to reach the households af-
fected by a major loss of wealth (re, ood, theft) in this community. We would like to
request your help in deciding how to reach households aected by a major loss of wealth
(re, ood, theft) in this community.
Assessing targeting assistant knowledgeable of neighbors
During the targeting assistant survey, TAs were asked about a random sample of adults living in
their neighborhood. We asked if the TA knew each of the individuals mentioned and, if so, we
asked them for their subjective beliefs about the other individual’s welfare. Specically, we asked
the TAs to express their belief about whether or not other households in the neighborhood were
among the poorest 20 percent of households in the neighborhood.
Half of the targeting assistants heard the rst framing (poverty) and the other half heard the
second framing (shocks). The variation was important to understand whether or not framing the
motivation changes the way in which targeting assistants assess the welfare of other members of
the community.
In addition to questions to assess the TAs familiarity with other members of the community,
TAs were asked the following two questions about the relative welfare of randomly selected
households within their community:
Question 1: Please imagine a 5-step ladder. On the bottom, the rst step stand the poor-
est 20% of households in community name. On the highest step, the fth stands the
richest 20% of households in community name. Where do you think name’s household
stands when you think of how poor or wealthy name’s household is compared to others
in community name? (Ask the respondent to provide a number 1–5)
Question 2: If we asked other people in your community, what percentage would say
that name’s household is on the rst step of the ladder, that is in the poorest 20% of
households in community name?
We refer to the answers to the questions above as “votes” in the sense that TAs are providing
informed beliefs about their neighbors. IPA surveyors facilitating the targeting survey were
asked to assess the level of comprehension of each TA during the targeting survey. By in large,
TAs understood the questions and tasks presented to them. We observe no dierence between
nominated and non-nominated TAs in their level of comprehension.
Eliciting votes for cash grant beneciaries
We also asked each TA to nominate two households for a cash grant program. For each TA, we
randomly varied the ordering of the following two questions:
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Question 1:Think of households within this block, which household would make the
most use out of a cash grant?
Question 2: Within this block, is there a household who recently fell on hard times and
would benet most from a cash grant?
We required that a nominated beneciary be identied within the baseline database of adults
residing in the community. 135 households were nominated by a TA that said the household would
make the most use of a cash grant. 144 households were nominated because the TA believed the
household had fallen on hard times. 44 households received nominations through both questions.
Distribute cash grants
We conducted a matched-pairs design to establish a treatment and control group for the evaluation
of a cash grant. First, we organized households that were nominated in the targeting survey to
receive a cash grant into 8 strata. These strata were split by the type of targeting assistant
(nominated leader (NL), randomly selected leader (RL), nominated non-leader (NTA), randomly
selected non-leader (RTA)) and the type of beneciary nomination (households that would make
the most use out of a cash grant (Best) or households that recently fell on hard times (Hard))
among the nominated cash beneciaries.
To give all poor households a non-zero probability of receiving a cash grant, we randomly
selected households in the bottom 20% of the PMT score distribution to receive the cash grant.
This random selection of household comprises the ninth strata.
Within each stratum, we identied matched pairs of households. We matched households
on household size, the gender of household head, years in the community, in-degree centrality,
betweenness centrality, per capita expenditures, PMT score, health and economic shocks, and the
percent of TAs that knew the household in the targeting survey.
Our matching algorithm produced 560 pairs. Within each pair, we randomly selected one
household to receive a cash grant. Beneciaries of the cash grant drawing were eligible to receive
USD$80. One member of each selected beneciary household was invited by phone to collect
their cash grant at the IPA oces in central Monrovia. Cash grant beneciaries were required to
verify their identity (name, age, gender, phone number). Cash grants were only be distributed to
veried members of the urban neighborhoods included in the study. Households were eligible for
a maximum of one cash grant.
Cash Transfers were delivered between July 18 and 25, 2018. The recipients were assigned
specic slots of time within these days. We developed a SurveyCTO form to verify the information
of beneciaries when they arrived at the IPA oce.
Upon arrival to the IPA oce, a surveyor veried a photo ID of the recipient. Before receiving
the cash grant, the recipients were informed of three important aspects:
1. The cash grant was a free gift. Beneciaries would not have to pay anything back to IPA or
anyone else; they could use the money however they wish.
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2. It was a one-time cash grant. It would not be delivered every month or every year; only
this time.
3. The cash grant amount and the beneciary would remain condential on our side. IPA
would not tell anyone in their community nor the government that they have received the
cash grant (though they were free to tell whomever they wanted).
In total, 269 of the targeted 280 households collected the cash grant. Of those that did not
collect the cash grant, ve had moved away from Monrovia or were deceased and six refused to
or were unable to visit the IPA oce within the allotted time (3 weeks) to collect the cash grant.
Follow-up data collection.
Table 1.3: Panel Sample, Response Rates
Control Treated p-valueN=280 N=280
Baseline Response Rate 0.97 (0.18) 0.98 (0.15) 0.433
Endline Response Rate 0.96 (0.19) 0.97 (0.18) 0.650
Panel Attrition 0.04 (0.20) 0.03 (0.18) 0.632
Notes: For the full population across all 13 neighborhoods, the baseline response rate was
84.8%. Attrition indicates whether a household surveyed at baseline was not surveyed at
endline.
Endline data collection took place between August 6 and 19. A total of 580 households were
sampled for the endline survey: the 280 selected cash beneciaries and their 280 matched pair
households that would serve as a control group. Recipients of the cash grant were not obligated to
participate in the endline survey. We completed surveys with 540 of the targeted 560 households
(Non-response rate = 3.5%). Four households refused consent while 16 could not be tracked due
to relocation outside of Monrovia or absence for the duration of the endline survey. Ultimately,
we have complete endline data for 261 matched pairs (522 households).
Through the endline survey, we asked about labor activity of household members, subjective
well-being, household expenditures, household enterprises, asset ownership and purchases, health
and economic shocks in the past 12 months, and lending and borrowing outside of the household.
As shown in Table 1.3, we nd no dierential attrition across treatment groups. Column 1
is a check for any dierential response rates at baseline. Column 2 shows that there was no
dierential response at endline by treatment group. Moreover, Column 3 reveals that assignment
to the treatment and control group did not aect whether or not we were able to collect panel
data.
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1.4 Evidence
Welfare Measures, Shocks, and Social Networks
Machine learning approach to estimating expenditures
As outlined in Section 1.3, we listed all 2,656 households in 13 neighborhoods of Monrovia. We
collected basic identifying information about all households, we collected demographic informa-
tion on all adults in 2,434 households, and we completed a full socio-economic baseline surveys
in 2,253 households. During the baseline survey, we implemented multiple survey modules to
measure household welfare. A leading approach to measuring welfare is to conduct a detailed
expenditure module. Among a ten-percent random sample, we conducted a the household ex-
penditure module from the 2014–15 HIES with 257 households. Among the ten-percent sample,
mean per capita expenditures using the full expenditures module were 244.39 Liberian Dollars
(USD$2.36 in purchasing power parity (PPP)). We also implemented a reduced-form expenditure
module in which we collected data on aggregate expenses across ve expenditure categories: food,
clothing, health, school, and energy. Using the reduced-form expenditure module, among the
same ten-percent sample of households we estimate mean per capita at 230.05 Liberian Dollars.
The reduced-form module under estimates per capita expenditures by an average of 6 percent.
The “simple module” version of per capita expenditures is correlated with the full module esti-
mate of per capita expenditures2; however, the simple module slightly over predicts per-capita
expenses in poor households and underestimates expenditures in high-expenditure households.
Using the simple module for the full sample, our estimate of per capita expenditures is 259.39
Liberian Dollars.
We sought to construct a more robust prediction of per capita expenditures by training a
machine learning model to predict log per capita expenditures. Using the ten-percent sample that
completed the full expenditure module, we used three-fold cross-validation to compare a linear
model (elastic net) with a non-linear model (random forest). Our models included covariates for
demographic, asset, subjective welfare, and expenditure categories. The random forest algorithm
provided a lower RMSE, 0.759 compared to 0.792 from the elastic net algorithm.3 We then imputed
predicted per capita expenditures for the full sample. We will refer to the random forest prediction
as “Predicted PCE”. Figure 1.1 shows the relationship between the rank of households based on the
Predicted PCE vs. the simple expenditure module. Rank is calculated as suggested by Athey and
Imbens (2017), where households are ordered by their per capita expenditures then normalized
to have zero mean.4 We nd that a one step increase in the rank of a household based on the
simple module is associated with a 0.86 step increase in the rank of Predicted PCE. Our preferred
measure of household welfare is the Predicted PCE since it captures long-run wealth dierences
through the inclusion of asset-based wealth and demographic characteristics.
2See Figure A.1.2.
3McBride and Nichols (2016) make the case for using the random forest algorithm to predict welfare.
4We use the following equation to construct the zero-mean ranks, Ri = R(i; Y obsi , . . . , Y
obs
N ) =∑N
j=1 1Y obsi <Y obsN +
1
2 (1 +
∑N
j=1 1Y obsi =Y obsN ) +
N+1
2
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Figure 1.1: Per capita expenditure rank, simple module vs. predicted by random forest
In addition to our measures of household and per capita expenditures, we collected baseline
data for three additional welfare metrics: an asset-based proxy-means test, a subjective welfare
measure, and a measure of food security.
We collected asset information for the 10-question Proxy Means Test.5 We worked with the
research team at IPA to implement the method outlined in Kshirsagar et al. (2017) to construct a
PMT specically for urban Liberia.6 Using a bootstrapped elastic net to select the combination of
10 variables that are consistently found to predict whether or not a household is below the national
poverty line from the 2014–15 HIES, we arrived at a PMT module that asked about ownership of
a telephone, chairs, wardrobes, computer, books, source of electricity, source of lighting, source
of drinking water, household size, and region of the country. The PMT score for Monrovia ranges
from 10 (the base score for the region in which Monrovia is located) and 100. Households at
the lower end of the scale are predicted to be poorer than those at the upper end. The median
5Our proxy means test is based on the Poverty Probability Index (PPI), see https://www.povertyindex.org.
6We also construct a wealth index following the approach of Filmer and Pritchett (1999) and Kolenikov and
Angeles (2009) we use the rst principal component from a set of asset ownership as a proxy for household wealth.
The resulting wealth index ranges from -3.60 to 2.92 with a mean of -0.60 and median of -0.64. The PCA is highly
correlated with the PMT score generated by the PPI method. As such, we focus our discussion on the PPI-based PMT
score.
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household in our sample has a PMT score of 55.7
Additionally, we asked households for their subjective assessment of their wealth relative to
other households in their community using a version of the Cantril Ladder method (Cantril 1966;
Deaton 2008). We posed the following question to each household:
Please imagine a 5-step ladder. On the bottom, the rst step stand the poorest 20% of
households in Zone X, Block Y. On the highest step, the fth, stands the richest 20% of
households in Zone X, Block Y.
Where do you think your household stands when you think of how poor or wealthy your
household is compared to others in your Block?
The median household considers itself to be on the second step of the Cantril ladder; 26
percent of households consider themselves to be on the lowest step of the ladder. Only 12 percent
of households consider themselves to be on the top two steps of the ladder. We also asked about
the number of meals per day that a household eats. The mean number of meals per day was 1.79.
In order to gain an assessment of existing social safety nets, we asked households about
potential sources of nancial support. We asked the following question about family members
and friends separately:
If you needed money for anything (such as daily expenses, do business, x house), how
many FAMILY MEMBERS do you feel you could go to for help? 8
Very few households report that they could go to family or friends for nancial assistance.
The median has one family member and zero friends that they could go to for money. Only
one percent of households report assistance (money, stipend, allowance, scholarships, food, or
supplies) from a government entity and two percent of households report similar assistance from
a non-governmental organization (NGO).
At baseline, we asked about four potential shocks at the household level:
1. Has anyone in the household lost his/her main source of income in the last 12 months?
2. Has anyone in the household lost property or major assets because someone stole it, or because
of re or ooding in the last 12 months?
3. Did any members of our household have to stop working for a period of more than 2 weeks due
to illness or injury in the past 12 months?
4. Did any members of your household die in the past 12 months?
7Figure A.1.3 shows that the PMT score is weakly correlated with per capita expenditures, as estimated through
the simple expenditure module.
8We used the same wording for FRIENDS.
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Table 1.4: Baseline Summary Statistics, by PCE Quintile
Population Predicted PCE Quintile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
N=2656 N=532 N=531 N=531 N=531 N=531 p-value
Welfare:
Household expenditure (LD) 914.02 (886.7) 594.38 (524.8) 789.15 (704.2) 860.43 (737.7) 1115.8 (1062.1) 1149.1 (1054.7) <0.01
Per capita expenditure (LD) 259.39 (284.26) 106.39 (100.83) 158.77 (153.26) 188.80 (150.87) 289.00 (271.29) 492.64 (382.19) <0.01
Predicted PCE (LD) 169.71 (89.76) 91.30 (18.88) 123.70 (5.28) 143.12 (7.34) 180.60 (15.33) 309.96 (104.22) 0.00
Household rents dwelling 0.71 (0.45) 0.63 (0.48) 0.66 (0.47) 0.70 (0.46) 0.77 (0.42) 0.77 (0.42) <0.01
Number of rooms in dwelling 1.53 (1.12) 1.59 (1.16) 1.69 (1.36) 1.59 (1.16) 1.51 (1.08) 1.36 (0.87) <0.01
Proxy means score 53.85 (14.57) 43.81 (12.41) 49.55 (12.12) 52.42 (12.82) 56.94 (12.63) 64.35 (12.80) <0.01
Cantril ladder (1–5) 2.32 (1.10) 2.00 (0.98) 2.26 (1.11) 2.33 (1.11) 2.46 (1.17) 2.52 (1.08) <0.01
Meals per day 1.79 (0.70) 1.46 (0.55) 1.69 (0.67) 1.83 (0.65) 1.90 (0.71) 2.03 (0.75) <0.01
Any shock in past 12 months 0.68 (0.47) 0.63 (0.48) 0.80 (0.40) 0.71 (0.46) 0.63 (0.48) 0.64 (0.48) <0.01
Wealth shock in past 12 months 0.50 (0.50) 0.49 (0.50) 0.52 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 0.48 (0.50) 0.52 (0.50) 0.60
Health shock in past 12 months 0.32 (0.47) 0.35 (0.48) 0.35 (0.48) 0.29 (0.46) 0.32 (0.47) 0.30 (0.46) 0.16
Demographic/Social:
Household size 4.41 (2.63) 6.05 (3.22) 5.34 (2.42) 4.70 (2.10) 3.86 (1.95) 2.51 (1.47) <0.01
Household head is female 0.25 (0.44) 0.33 (0.47) 0.24 (0.43) 0.22 (0.42) 0.21 (0.41) 0.25 (0.44) <0.01
Years in community 10.08 (10.83) 13.12 (12.11) 11.91 (11.50) 10.22 (10.93) 7.84 (8.83) 8.06 (9.83) <0.01
Household includes community leader 0.14 (0.35) 0.15 (0.36) 0.14 (0.35) 0.16 (0.37) 0.13 (0.34) 0.13 (0.33) 0.51
Religion is Christian 0.71 (0.45) 0.73 (0.45) 0.72 (0.45) 0.69 (0.46) 0.70 (0.46) 0.72 (0.45) 0.77
In-degree centrality 2.84 (3.04) 3.45 (3.29) 2.32 (2.86) 2.75 (3.27) 3.02 (2.94) 2.68 (2.71) <0.01
Betweenness centrality 271.83 (410.02) 342.13 (450.99) 206.10 (362.66) 270.20 (408.88) 287.49 (418.20) 253.09 (393.56) <0.01
Eigenvector centrality 0.12 (0.18) 0.16 (0.20) 0.09 (0.15) 0.12 (0.18) 0.14 (0.18) 0.12 (0.16) <0.01
# Family assistance 0.86 (1.18) 0.70 (0.99) 0.80 (1.05) 0.80 (1.15) 0.87 (1.16) 1.06 (1.41) <0.01
# Friends assistance 0.73 (1.19) 0.61 (1.05) 0.67 (1.12) 0.67 (1.07) 0.73 (1.16) 0.91 (1.45) <0.01
Government assistance 0.01 (0.10) <0.01 (0.06) 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.10) 0.02 (0.13) 0.34
NGO assistance 0.02 (0.15) 0.03 (0.16) 0.03 (0.16) 0.02 (0.12) 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.15) 0.85
Tables A.1.3, A.1.4, and A.1.5 provide baseline descriptive statistics by neighborhood. P-value is derived from the t-test for equality of all quintiles.
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We categorized the rst two shocks (loss of income source and loss of property as wealth
shocks. The other two shocks (injury and death) are categorized as health shocks. Loss of income
source and stop working due to illness or injury are uncorrelated (ρ = 0.15). As such, we believe
that the two questions successfully dierentiate economic and health shocks.
Half of all households report an economic shock in the preceding 12 months. 28 percent report
a loss of income source and 36 percent report property loss. About one-third report a health shock.
24 percent stated that a member of the household stopped work due to illness or injury. 11 percent
of households report a death within the household. 62 percent of households experienced at least
one form of a shock in the 12 months preceding the baseline survey.
Figure 1.2: Correlation between Welfare and Social Network Measures
Social network centrality
Households, on average, were named by 2.84 other households in their block. This measure is
termed as in-degree centrality, or how many incoming social ties a household has. Between-
ness centrality provides a measure of how well individual households are positioned to connect
socially-disconnected clusters of households in the social network. eigenvector accounts for the
centrality of households that a given node is connected to and ranges from zero to one. On average,
households have an eigenvector centrality of 0.12.
Table 1.4 presents summary statistics from households surveyed at baseline. Column 1 pro-
vides aggregate statistics for all households surveyed. On average, households comprised of 4.41
people and had lived in the community for ten years. The median household has been living in
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their community of Monrovia for six years; 16.8 percent of households have lived in the commu-
nity for less than 2 years. As such residency in the study areas is largely permanent with recent
in-migration composing less than one-fth of the population.
Panel A of Figure 1.2 displays the correlation coecient between Predicted PCE and survey-
based welfare measures. We see that the absolute value of the correlation coecient is greater
than 0.4 for three measures: per capita expenditures (simple module), PMT score, and household
size.
Columns 2–6 of Table 1.4 show summary statistics broken down by quintile of Predicted PCE.9
We see that poorer households have lived in their community longer, state that they are lower on
the Cantril Ladder, and consume fewer meals per day. We see no dierence in the likelihood that
a household experienced a wealth or health shock in the preceding 12 months.
The poorest quintile of households are no more likely than other households to include a
community leader. Women constitute one-quarter of household heads. The poorest households
are more likely to be female-headed.
The population of the communities is diverse. Christianity is the main religion within the
study area with 70 percent of households reporting aliation with a Christian denomination.
However, Muslim households constitute 40 to 55 percent of households in ve neighborhoods
and 39 percent of the total sample. The religion of households is similar across all quintiles of
Predicted PCE. Households come from more than 21 dierent tribes with Kru (14.5%), Kpelle
(13.7%), Grebo (11.36%), and Vai (9.89%) being the most common tribes household heads.
In Panel B of Figure 1.2, we show that eigenvector centrality is correlated with in-degree
centrality and betweenness centrality, however, there is no evident linear correlation with welfare
or demographic characteristics. When we compare means across quintiles of Predicted PCE, as
shown in Table 1.4, we do see that households in the poorest quintile have higher social network
centrality.
Who are considered knowledgeable community members?
In accordance with the design presented in Section 1.3, we elicited nominations from each of the
households surveyed at the time of the baseline. In Table 1.5, we present summary statistics for
nominated households as well as households that include a community leader.
Thirty-ve percent of households received at least one nomination. On average, households
received 0.63 nominations. Conditional on receiving at least one nomination, households received
an average of two nominations. One household received 49 nominations; however, the majority of
nominated households received only one nomination. Among nominated households, 84 percent
had only one household member nominated. Only 12 households had more than two household
members nominated.
Nominated households were distinct along several key welfare and social dimensions. Nom-
inated households were larger and had lived in the community longer. Nominated households
reported lower per capita expenditures and higher PMT score. However, using our preferred
9Quintiles are calculated for each neighborhood.
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Table 1.5: Summary Statistics for Leaders and Nominated Households
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Population All Leaders Nominated Leaders vs.Non-Leaders
Nominated vs.
Un-Nominated
N=2656 N=345 N=820 p-value p-value
Welfare:
Household expenditures (LD) 914 (887) 1005 (918) 984 (880) 0.052 0.006
Per capita expenditures (LD) 259 (284) 263 (325) 242 (268) 0.805 0.027
Predicted PCE (LD) 170 (89.8) 170 (95.5) 169 (95.2) 0.427 0.780
Household rents dwelling 0.71 (0.45) 0.61 (0.49) 0.65 (0.48) <0.001 <0.001
Number of rooms in dwelling 1.53 (1.12) 1.81 (1.27) 1.74 (1.27) <0.001 <0.001
Proxy means score 53.9 (14.6) 56.4 (15.3) 55.3 (13.7) 0.001 <0.001
Wealth index (PCA) -0.60 (1.17) -0.22 (1.20) -0.32 (1.14) <0.001 <0.001
Cantril ladder (1–5) 2.32 (1.10) 2.45 (1.14) 2.44 (1.10) 0.021 <0.001
Meals per day 1.79 (0.70) 1.80 (0.68) 1.81 (0.69) 0.794 0.327
Any shock in past 12 months 0.68 (0.47) 0.69 (0.46) 0.67 (0.47) 0.090 0.515
Wealth shock in past 12 months 0.50 (0.50) 0.57 (0.50) 0.52 (0.50) 0.006 0.166
Health shock in past 12 months 0.32 (0.47) 0.34 (0.47) 0.34 (0.47) 0.571 0.192
Demographic/Social:
Household size 4.41 (2.63) 5.16 (3.00) 5.18 (2.91) <0.001 <0.001
Household head is female 0.25 (0.44) 0.20 (0.40) 0.24 (0.43) 0.005 0.225
Years in community 10.1 (10.8) 12.3 (11.5) 11.7 (11.1) <0.001 <0.001
Household includes leader 0.14 (0.35) 1.00 (0.00) 0.20 (0.40) - <0.001
Religion is Christian 0.71 (0.45) 0.85 (0.36) 0.75 (0.44) <0.001 0.009
In-degree centrality 2.84 (3.04) 4.09 (3.69) 5.23 (3.52) <0.001 <0.001
Betweenness centrality 272 (410) 438 (646) 479 (557) <0.001 <0.001
Eigenvector centrality 0.12 (0.18) 0.17 (0.22) 0.19 (0.23) 0.002 <0.001
Nominations:
Count of nominations 0.63 (1.78) 1.59 (3.94) 2.06 (2.71) <0.001 <0.001
Unique HH Members nominated 0.36 (0.59) 0.59 (0.72) 1.17 (0.43) <0.001 0.000
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses.
measure of welfare, Predicted PCE, we do not see any statistically signicant dierence between
nominated and un-nominated households.
Nominated households were more central within the social network. Across all three of our
centrality measures, nominated households displayed much higher centrality scores than un-
nominated households. Nominated households were more likely to include a leader; 20 percent
of nominated households included a leader. When we look exclusively at leaders within the
community (Column 2 of Table 1.5), we see that leaders were more central within the social
network. The direction of dierences for reported per capita expenditures and asset-based welfare
measures mirrors that of nominated households. Again, on our preferred measure of welfare that
includes non-linear relationships between expenditures and assets, Predicted PCE, we fail to reject
the null hypothesis that leaders were dierent, on average, from non-leaders.
Table 1.6 presents the main ndings for the rst stage of the targeting study. The table presents
coecients from the following model for a host of dependent variables as derived through the
process of eliciting nominations for knowledgeable community members. We use the following
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regression specication for the models in Table 1.6:
Yi = ρ2Prompt2 + ρ3Prompt3 +Xiβ + νc + i (1.1)
As outlined in Section 1.3, we elicited nominations through one of three randomly selected
prompts. Prompt2 andPrompt3 are dummy variables indicating whether the nominated through
prompt 2 or prompt 3. Prompt 1 is the held-out reference group. Xi is a 1×6 vector of the follow-
ing six nominating household characteristics: (1) Predicted PCE Rank, (2)gender of respondent,
(3) years in the community, (4) leader households, (5) religion is Christian, and (6) eigenvector
centrality. We also adjust for community xed eects, νc.
In Panel A of Table 1.6 shows the results for regression Equation 1.1 where the dependent
variable is a dummy for whether or not the household provided a nomination (Column 1) and,
conditional on providing a nomination, whether or not the nominee was found within the census
listing database for the neighborhood (Column 2). We see no dierential nomination rates across
prompt type. We observe that Christian households were ve percentage points more likely to
provide a nomination. And higher social network centrality is correlated with higher nominations
rates — a 1 standard deviation increase in eigenvector centrality is correlated with a 3 percentage
point increase in providing a nomination and a 6 percentage point jump in the probability that
we were able to identify a nomination in the census listing.
Panel B presents our homophily specications, where the dependent variable is characteristic
k of the nominee, j, that the baseline household, i, proposes. We slightly modify the regression
equation to the following:
Xj,k = ρ2Prompt2 + ρ3Prompt3 +Xiβ + νc + i (1.2)
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Table 1.6: Homophily in Nominating Knowledgeable Community Members
(A)
Nomination Outcome
(B)
Nominee (j) Characteristics
(C)
Dyadic Distance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Any
Nomination
Nomination
Found
Pred. PCE
Rank Female
Years in
Community Leader Christian
Eigenvector
Centrality
Social
Distance
Geographic
Distance
Nomination Prompt:
Prompt 2 (ρ2) −0.01 −0.00 −41.33 0.09∗∗ −0.53 0.03 −0.01 −0.02 0.15∗ 3.99
(0.01) (0.02) (45.00) (0.03) (0.73) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (3.16)
Prompt 3 (ρ3) −0.01 0.01 −101.52∗ 0.05 −0.70 −0.00 0.01 0.00 0.18∗∗ −0.23
(0.01) (0.02) (45.25) (0.03) (0.70) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (2.84)
Nominating (i) Characteristics:
Predicted PCE Rank (β1) 0.00 0.00 0.07∗∗ 0.00 −0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.00∗ −0.00∗ 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female (β2) 0.01 −0.02 6.06 0.15∗∗∗ 0.24 −0.03 −0.01 0.01 −0.02 2.06
(0.01) (0.02) (40.24) (0.02) (0.63) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (2.48)
Years in Comm. (SD) (β3) 0.01 0.00 −15.71 0.04∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗ 0.01 −0.01 −0.01∗ 0.04 1.59
(0.01) (0.01) (18.60) (0.01) (0.33) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (1.12)
Leader HH (β4) 0.03∗ −0.03 −20.33 0.05 −0.30 0.15∗∗∗ −0.02 −0.02 −0.07 13.14∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.03) (52.47) (0.03) (0.81) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (3.82)
Christian (β5) 0.05∗∗∗ −0.03 118.60∗∗ −0.00 1.15 0.05∗ 0.36∗∗∗ −0.00 0.02 −3.43
(0.01) (0.02) (43.13) (0.03) (0.64) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06) (2.82)
Eigenvector (SD) (β6) 0.03∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ −57.12∗∗ −0.01 −0.13 0.04∗∗ 0.01 0.15∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −3.41∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (18.24) (0.01) (0.30) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (1.06)
Adj. R2 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.23 0.40 0.04 0.10
Num. obs. 2231 2059 1675 1675 1614 1675 1623 1675 1651 1675
ρ2 = ρ3 (p-value) 0.39 0.91 0.07 0.005 0.32 0.58 0.95 0.57 0.001 0.46
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.78 0.81 0.00 0.50 10.07 0.14 0.71 0.12 3.88 105.85
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. All regressions use ordinary least squares with Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses. Neighborhood xed eects
included. One of three nomination prompts was randomly assigned to each baseline respondent, see table A.1.6 for balance statistics by prompt type.
Nomination Prompt 1 (Reference): If we want to spread information about a social assistance program, to whom do you suggest we speak? (N = 811);
Nomination Prompt 2: If we want to identify which people would be best to help us identify which people in this block would benet most from a social assistance program, to whom do
you suggest we speak? (N = 698);
Nomination Prompt 3: If we want to identify which people would be best to help us identify which people in this block would benet most from a cash gift for social assistance, to whom
do you suggest we speak? (N = 744)
“Any Nomination” equals 1 if the baseline respondent provided a TA nomination, 0 if not. “Nomination Found” is conditional on the respondent providing a nomination and equals 1 if the
nominee was found within the community census database, 0 if not. Predicted PCE Rank is the household ranking of the per capita expenditures as predicted by our random forest
algorithm, centered at zero. Social Distance is the shortest path between the nominating and nominated household as calculated using social network data from the baseline. Geographic
distance is the number of meters between the nominating and nominated household’s dwelling as measured by the spherical geodesic distance between the latitude-longitude coordinates
of the dwellings.
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We observe a great deal of homophily in nominations. As evidenced along the diagonal in
Panel B of Table1.6, we observe a high degree of positive correlation across nominator-nominee
characteristics. A one-step increase in the Predicted PCE rank of the nominator is associated with
a 0.07 step increase of the nominee’s Predicted PCE rank. Women were 15 percentage points
more likely to be nominated if the nominator is a woman. One standard deviation increase in the
nominator’s tenure in the community is associated with a 1.03 years increase in the nominee’s
tenure. Leaders were 15 percentage points more likely to nominate another leader. Christian
households nominated other Christian households at a much higher rate. And high-eigenvector
centrality nominators proposed central nominees.
In Panel C, we examine the dyadic distance between nominator i and nominee i. In Column 9,
our dependent variable is the shortest distance along un-directed social network edges from i to j.
We see that prompts 2 and 3 elicited nominees that were 0.15 to 0.18 degrees more socially distant
from the nominator. This result suggests that when we mention targeting of a social assistance
program, individuals conduct a more extended search of their network. The prompts do not show
a clear pattern in correlation with nominee characteristics. Two exceptions are worth noting.
Prompt 3 resulted in nominees that had lower Predicted PCE. Moreover, Prompt 2 led to more
female nominees. Column 10 uses geographic distance (in meters) to assess the dyadic distance
in nominations. We fail to reject the null hypothesis that the prompts led to dierent geographic
distance.
Do nominated community members possess more accurate
information?
As discussed in Section 1.3, we conducted one-on-one interviews with 394 community members
through what we refer to as Targeting Assistant (TA) surveys. 254 of the TAs were drawn from
those nominated by other community members during the baseline survey. Table 1.7 provides
aggregate summary statistics from the TA surveys. In total, we queried 11,315 dyadic relationships
between the TAs and randomly selected households from the TA’s neighborhood. When asked if
they know a randomly selected neighbor, nominated TAs knew 36 percent of their neighbors.
In comparison, un-nominated TAs knew 32 percent of neighbors. This can be explained by
the fact that nominated TAs were more socially connected. Conrming the friendship paradox
(Jackson 2019), we see that the social distance between nominated TAs and randomly selected
neighbors is less than similar measure for un-nominated TAs. Nominated TAs were more likely
to talk to known neighbors on a daily basis. We also note that the geographic distance between
TAs and random neighbors is greater for the nominated TAs, suggesting that those nominated
were seen to be knowledgeable across more area.
Among the neighbors that TAs know, approximately 37 percent were considered friends.10
10Because TAs were asked about a large number of neighbors, we may be concerned about survey fatigue inu-
encing the truthfulness of reporting. For this reason, we randomized the order of the neighbors that each TA was
asked about. Appendix Figure A.1.4 shows that there is a downward trend in TAs reporting that they know a neigh-
bor. In our regression analysis, we control for the order in which neighbors appear in the TA survey. We do not nd
evidence of survey fatigue that eected nominated and un-nominated TAs dierentially.
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Nominated TAs were no more likely to consider known neighbors as friends or family. TAs state
that they have borrowed from or lent money to thirteen percent of neighbors that were known (4.5
percent of all neighbors when we assume that they have not borrowed from or lent to unknown
neighbors).
Table 1.7: TA Assessment of Randomly Selected Neighbors
All TAs Un-Nominated Nominated p-value
TA knows the neighbor 0.35 (0.48) 0.32 (0.47) 0.36 (0.48) <0.001
Social distance to neighbor 3.60 (1.21) 3.69 (1.21) 3.56 (1.20) <0.001
Distance to neighbor (meters) 96.6 (84.9) 90.7 (81.4) 99.7 (86.5) <0.001
Conditional on TA knowing neighbor:
Relationship to neighbor: 0.380
Family 223 (5.29%) 77 (5.66%) 146 (5.11%)
Friend 1582 (37.5%) 525 (38.6%) 1057 (37.0%)
Other Neighbor 2413 (57.2%) 758 (55.7%) 1655 (57.9%)
Frequency of communication with neighbor: (*) <0.001
Daily 2206 (52.3%) 649 (47.8%) 1557 (54.5%)
Weekly 1358 (32.2%) 487 (35.8%) 871 (30.5%)
Less than weekly 652 (15.5%) 223 (16.4%) 429 (15.0%)
TA has borrowed from or lent to neighbor (**) 0.13 (0.34) 0.12 (0.33) 0.14 (0.34) 0.244
TA’s view of neighbor’s welfare: (***) 0.370
1st step 1249 (29.9%) 404 (29.9%) 845 (29.9%)
2nd step 1695 (40.6%) 566 (41.9%) 1129 (40.0%)
3rd-5th step 1229 (29.5%) 380 (28.1%) 849 (30.1%)
Prop. would say neighbor is in poorest 20%? (****) 0.52 (0.31) 0.52 (0.29) 0.53 (0.32) 0.433
Notes: Chi-squared test used for categorical variables.
Social Distance is the shortest path between the TA and the randomly selected neighbor as calculated using social network
data from the baseline survey. Geographic distance is the number of meters between the TA’s and neighbor’s dwelling as
measured by the geodesic distance between the latitude-longitude coordinates of the dwellings.
(*) “How often would you say that you communicate with anyone in [NAME]’s household?”
(**) “Have you ever borrowed money from, lent money, or given or received a gift from anyone in [NAME]’s household?”
(***) “Please look at this 5-step ladder. On the bottom, the rst step stand the poorest 20% of households in [NEIGHBORHOOD].
On the highest step, the fth, stands the richest 20% of households in [NEIGHBORHOOD]. Where do you think [NAME]’s
household stands when you think of how poor or wealthy [NAME]’s household is compared to others in [NEIGHBORHOOD]?”
(****) “If we asked 10 people from your community in [NEIGHBORHOOD], how many would say that [NAME]’s household
is on the rst step of the ladder?” (Response divided by 10 to show proportion in table.)
In Table A.1.7, we show TA knowledge of neighbors by three types of TAs: Randomly Selected,
Nominated, and Leaders. Leaders were more likely to state that they know randomly selected
neighbors. However, among known neighbors, leaders were no more likely to classify neighbors
as poor.
When presented with the opportunity to vote on the welfare of a randomly selected neighbor
(refer to question text in Section 1.3), TAs reported that 30 percent of neighbors were on the bottom
step of the Cantril Ladder. This proportion is the same for nominated and un-nominated TAs.
Eliciting this information from leaders, nominated TAs, or random TAs yielded the same result
among known neighbors. TAs appeared to think that other community members are more likely
to consider their neighbors as poor. When asked what proportion of ten community members
would say that the random neighbor is on the bottom step of the Cantril Ladder, TAs estimated
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that 5.3 community members would respond in the armative. This suggests that the TAs possess
some unique knowledge of their neighbors.
In Table 1.8, we display aggregate knowledge and votes of households from the TA survey. We
assigned households to appear in ve TA surveys, we see that there was near complete compliance
with this goal; households appeared on average in 4.98 TA surveys. Consistent with evidence
in Table 1.4, we see that the bottom two quintiles are more likely to be known. However, we
cannot reject equivalence across quintiles. We do, though, see clear evidence that TAs provided
meaningful votes in that households in the poorest two quintiles are more likely to be seen as poor.
The dierence is minimal, however, due to the fact that 88 percent of TA votes for households
in the bottom quintile of Predicted PCE do not classify the household on the bottom step of the
Cantril Ladder.
Table 1.8: TA Knowledge of Neighbors, by Predicted PCE Quintile
Predicted PCE Quintile of Neighbor
All 1 2 3 4 5 p-
value
# times mentioned in TA Survey 4.98 (0.13) 4.98
(0.16)
4.98
(0.12)
4.98
(0.15)
4.99
(0.11)
4.99
(0.10)
0.225
Prop. of TAs that know HH 0.35 (0.26) 0.36
(0.26)
0.36
(0.25)
0.35
(0.27)
0.35
(0.26)
0.33
(0.25)
0.218
Prop. of TAs votes as poor HH (when known) (*) 0.31 (0.37) 0.34
(0.38)
0.34
(0.38)
0.29
(0.37)
0.29
(0.36)
0.30
(0.37)
0.072
Prop. of TAs votes as poor HH (All TAs) 0.10 (0.15) 0.12
(0.16)
0.12
(0.16)
0.10
(0.14)
0.10
(0.14)
0.09
(0.13)
0.004
Prop. of community that would say HH is poor (**) 0.53 (0.26) 0.53
(0.26)
0.53
(0.27)
0.55
(0.25)
0.53
(0.25)
0.51
(0.27)
0.222
Errors:
Prop. of votes as poor household 0.10 (0.14) - 0.12
(0.16)
0.10
(0.14)
0.10
(0.14)
0.09
(0.13)
0.017
Prop. of votes as non-poor household 0.88 (0.16) 0.88
(0.16)
- - - - -
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. P-value is from the test for equivalence of all quintiles.
(*) “Please look at this 5-step ladder. On the bottom, the rst step stand the poorest 20% of households in [NEIGHBORHOOD].
On the highest step, the fth, stands the richest 20% of households in [NEIGHBORHOOD]. Where do you think [NAME]’s
household stands when you think of how poor or wealthy [NAME]’s household is compared to others in [NEIGHBORHOOD]?”
(**) “If we asked 10 people from your community in [NEIGHBORHOOD], how many would say that [NAME]’s household
is on the rst step of the ladder?” (Response divided by 10 and geometric mean of TA beliefs is displayed in the table.)
We nd that social distance — the steps in the social network graph from the TA to the random
neighbor — was highly correlated with the quality of TA knowledge. For each additional step
away from a household in social distance, the TA was 8 percentage points less likely to know the
other household. Table 1.9 shows this relationship between the social distance between a TA and
their neighbor and the accuracy of the TAs reporting.11 Here accuracy, the dependent variable, is
equal to one if the TA correctly classied the household either above or below the 20th percentile
11In the Appendix, we provide similar tables where the dependent variable is whether or not the TA knows the
neighbor (Table A.1.8).
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of the welfare distribution. Moving from one-degree social distance to two degrees of separation
reduces the likelihood of accurate reporting by 13 to 17 percentage points. After two degrees
of separation, reporting accuracy drops again but stays rather level all the way to unconnected
neighbors (Social Distance =∞).
We nd little evidence that nominated TAs provided more accurate information. Across most
social distances, nominated TAs show no statistically signicant increase in accuracy over un-
nominated TAs. This is explained by the dueling tendencies of nominated TAs to provide lower
exclusion errors and higher inclusion errors for rst-degree social contacts. We dene an exclusion
error as a vote, Vij , from TA i that incorrectly classies a poor neighbor j as non-poor (i.e. not
in the bottom 20% of neighbors, Vij 6= 1). Wj is a dummy variable equal to one if the Predicted
PCE places household j in the bottom quintile of the welfare distribution for the neighborhood.
Similarly, we identify an error of inclusion where the TA’s vote incorrectly labeled a non-poor
household as poor.
AccurateV oteij =
∑
1[Vij 6=1|Wj 6=1] + 1[Vij=1|Wj=1] (1.3)
ExclusionErrorij = 1[Vij 6=1|Wj=1] (1.4)
InclusionErrorij = 1[Vij=1|Wj 6=1] (1.5)
Table 1.10 presents regression results where exclusion error is the dependent variable. Ta-
ble 1.11 shows our model results for inclusion errors. This suggests TAs were prone to provide
inaccurate votes for adjacent social network ties.
When examined in the aggregate, TAs with more nominations tended to be more accurate.
We sum exclusion errors and inclusion errors for each TA to calculate an aggregate score.
AccuracyRatei =
∑J
j=1AccurateV oteij
J
(1.6)
ExclusionRatei =
∑J
j=1ExclusionErrorij
J
(1.7)
InclusionRatei =
∑J
j=1 InclusionErrorij
J
(1.8)
Figure 1.3 shows the scatterplot and bivariate linear regression of TA information value on
the number of nominations that a TA received. We see that the accuracy of TAs is correlated with
the number of nominations that at TA received, even when excluding the outlier TA that received
49 nominations. The lift gained from additional nominations, however, is rather small — each
additional nomination is associated with a one percentage point increase in the accuracy rate.
We do not observe a statistically signicant correlation between the number of TA nominations
and the inclusion or exclusion error rates of TAs (Panels B and C of Figure 1.3). The coecient
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on number of nominations is negative for exclusion errors, -0.003, but not statistically signi-
cant. Working in the opposite direction, the coecient on number of nominations is positive for
inclusion errors, 0.003, but not statistically signicant.
Table 1.9: Targeting Assistant Accuracy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social Distance = 2 −0.132∗∗∗ −0.172∗∗∗ −0.132∗∗∗ −0.174∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.046) (0.026) (0.046)
Social Distance = 3 −0.214∗∗∗ −0.220∗∗∗ −0.208∗∗∗ −0.221∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.043) (0.024) (0.043)
Social Distance = 4 −0.251∗∗∗ −0.245∗∗∗ −0.245∗∗∗ −0.246∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.043) (0.023) (0.043)
Social Distance = 5 −0.276∗∗∗ −0.252∗∗∗ −0.267∗∗∗ −0.245∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.044) (0.024) (0.044)
Social Distance = 6 −0.252∗∗∗ −0.239∗∗∗ −0.246∗∗∗ −0.229∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.050) (0.030) (0.052)
Social Distance = 7 −0.285∗∗∗ −0.186∗ −0.250∗∗∗ −0.164
(0.044) (0.076) (0.047) (0.084)
Social Distance = 8 −0.201 −0.290∗ −0.248∗∗ −0.367∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.127) (0.091) (0.047)
Social Distance =∞ −0.280∗∗∗ −0.285∗∗∗ −0.302∗∗∗ −0.306∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.045) (0.028) (0.046)
Nominated TA 0.028 0.021
(0.049) (0.049)
Nominated TA * Social Distance = 2 0.059 0.062
(0.055) (0.055)
Nominated TA * Social Distance = 3 0.011 0.022
(0.052) (0.052)
Nominated TA * Social Distance = 4 −0.006 0.005
(0.051) (0.051)
Nominated TA * Social Distance = 5 −0.035 −0.030
(0.052) (0.053)
Nominated TA * Social Distance = 6 −0.017 −0.023
(0.062) (0.063)
Nominated TA * Social Distance = 7 −0.178∗ −0.147
(0.090) (0.099)
Nominated TA * Social Distance = 8 0.176 0.216
(0.200) (0.153)
Nominated TA * Social Distance =∞ 0.019 0.030
(0.055) (0.060)
Adj. R2 0.023 0.025 0.043 0.044
Num. obs. 12130 12130 11140 11140
Neighbor Covariates NO NO YES YES
Neighbor Order F.E. YES YES YES YES
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Dependent variable is a binary variable equal to one if the respondent (TA) correctly classies a
household as poor or non-poor based on the household being in the bottom quintile of the predicted per-capita expenditure distribution of the
neighborhood. SD indicates that a variables has been mean-centered and scaled to represent one standard standard deviation.
Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses. Neighbor-Order xed eects included. Social Distance is the shortest path between
the nominating and nominated household as calculated using social network data from the baseline.
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Table 1.10: Targeting Assistant Exclusion Error
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social Distance = 2 0.100∗ −0.099 0.095∗ −0.104
(0.046) (0.071) (0.046) (0.070)
Social Distance = 3 0.201∗∗∗ −0.020 0.191∗∗∗ −0.023
(0.042) (0.062) (0.042) (0.061)
Social Distance = 4 0.219∗∗∗ 0.019 0.204∗∗∗ 0.010
(0.041) (0.060) (0.042) (0.059)
Social Distance = 5 0.236∗∗∗ 0.067 0.226∗∗∗ 0.052
(0.042) (0.060) (0.043) (0.060)
Social Distance = 6 0.199∗∗∗ −0.045 0.204∗∗∗ −0.047
(0.051) (0.085) (0.050) (0.084)
Social Distance = 7 0.252∗∗∗ −0.027 0.221∗∗∗ −0.087
(0.061) (0.120) (0.064) (0.143)
Social Distance = 8 0.301∗∗∗ 0.093 0.268∗∗∗ 0.056
(0.044) (0.061) (0.047) (0.062)
Social Distance =∞ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.032 0.213∗∗∗ 0.016
(0.046) (0.065) (0.048) (0.066)
Nominated TA −0.260∗∗∗ −0.257∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.075)
Nominated TA * Social Distance = 2 0.257∗∗ 0.260∗∗
(0.090) (0.089)
Nominated TA * Social Distance = 3 0.290∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.079)
Nominated TA * Social Distance = 4 0.258∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗
(0.078) (0.078)
Nominated TA * Social Distance = 5 0.206∗∗ 0.217∗∗
(0.080) (0.079)
Nominated TA * Social Distance = 6 0.331∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.101)
Nominated TA * Social Distance = 7 0.391∗∗ 0.427∗∗
(0.132) (0.153)
Nominated TA * Social Distance = 8 0.281∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.089)
Nominated TA * Social Distance =∞ 0.265∗∗ 0.253∗∗
(0.089) (0.093)
Adj. R2 0.039 0.044 0.041 0.045
Num. obs. 2627 2627 2542 2542
Neighbor Covariates NO NO YES YES
Neighbor Order F.E. YES YES YES YES
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Dependent variable is a binary variable equal to one if the respondent (TA) incorrectly classies
a poor household as non-poor. SD indicates that a variables has been mean-centered and scaled to represent one standard standard deviation.
Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses. Neighbor-Order xed eects included. Social Distance is the shortest path between
the nominating and nominated household as calculated using social network data from the baseline.
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Table 1.11: Targeting Assistant Inclusion Error
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social Distance = 2 −0.087∗∗∗ 0.006 −0.088∗∗∗ 0.019
(0.026) (0.041) (0.026) (0.041)
Social Distance = 3 −0.148∗∗∗ −0.083∗ −0.145∗∗∗ −0.070
(0.024) (0.037) (0.024) (0.037)
Social Distance = 4 −0.176∗∗∗ −0.083∗ −0.167∗∗∗ −0.062
(0.024) (0.037) (0.024) (0.037)
Social Distance = 5 −0.194∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗ −0.183∗∗∗ −0.085∗
(0.024) (0.038) (0.024) (0.038)
Social Distance = 6 −0.218∗∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗ −0.205∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗
(0.025) (0.039) (0.026) (0.040)
Social Distance = 7 −0.197∗∗∗ −0.143∗∗ −0.171∗∗∗ −0.111∗
(0.036) (0.046) (0.041) (0.051)
Social Distance = 8 −0.173∗ 0.029 −0.131 0.191
(0.076) (0.180) (0.096) (0.267)
Social Distance =∞ −0.198∗∗∗ −0.133∗∗∗ −0.206∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗
(0.025) (0.038) (0.026) (0.038)
Nominated TA 0.120∗∗ 0.135∗∗
(0.046) (0.046)
Nominated TA * Social Distance = 2 −0.135∗∗ −0.152∗∗
(0.052) (0.053)
Nominated TA * Social Distance = 3 −0.093 −0.107∗
(0.048) (0.048)
Nominated TA * Social Distance = 4 −0.135∗∗ −0.152∗∗
(0.047) (0.047)
Nominated TA * Social Distance = 5 −0.128∗∗ −0.141∗∗
(0.048) (0.048)
Nominated TA * Social Distance = 6 −0.111∗ −0.122∗
(0.050) (0.051)
Nominated TA * Social Distance = 7 −0.065 −0.069
(0.071) (0.080)
Nominated TA * Social Distance = 8 −0.314 −0.460
(0.182) (0.269)
Nominated TA * Social Distance =∞ −0.087 −0.111∗
(0.049) (0.052)
Adj. R2 0.023 0.025 0.024 0.026
Num. obs. 9503 9503 8598 8598
Neighbor Covariates NO NO YES YES
Neighbor Order F.E. YES YES YES YES
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Dependent variable is a binary variable equal to one if the respondent (TA) incorrectly classies
a non-poor household as poor. SD indicates that a variables has been mean-centered and scaled to represent one standard standard deviation.
Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses. Neighbor-Order xed eects included. Social Distance is the shortest path between
the nominating and nominated household as calculated using social network data from the baseline.
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Figure 1.3: Aggregate performance of TAs. Points jittered for visibility. Panel A: Slope point
estimate equals 0.009 with 95% CI for coecient is [0.006, 0.012]. Excluding the outlier with
49 nominations, the point estimate is 0.008 with 95% CI of [0.003, 0.013]. Panel B: Slope point
estimate equals 0.003 with 95% CI for coecient is [-0.004, 0.009]. Excluding the household with
49 nominations, the point estimate is 0.008 with 95% CI of [-0.001, 0.012]. Panel C: Slope point
estimate equals -0.003 with 95% CI for coecient is [-0.003, 0.003]. Excluding the household with
49 nominations, the point estimate is 0.008 with 95% CI of [-0.013, 0.001].
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Who receives votes for a cash grant social program?
TAs were allowed to nominate up to two members of their neighborhood to receive a cash grant.
We elicited the cash grant nominations through two questions, as discussed in Section 1.3. We nd
that households nominated for the cash grant were more likely to be socially connected. Female-
headed households, households that include a community leader, and Christian households were
more likely to receive cash grant nominations. We see in Table 1.12 that the method of cash
grant elicitation did not lead to dierences in demographic and social characteristics of cash grant
nominees. However, the ‘Hard Times’ prompt led to nominees with lower subjective welfare
(Cantril Ladder) and more likely to have experienced any shock in the preceding 12 months.
We take this to suggest that framing the nomination around shocks instead of best use leads to
increased targeting of households that are experiencing some recent hardships.
We also see that nominated households are, on average, poorer across multiple dimensions.
When we examine the relationship between household characteristics and cash grant nomina-
tions in a multivariate regression specication, as in Table A.1.9, we see that the coecients
on eigenvector centrality and Predicted PCE Rank are statistically signicant. Thus, controlling
for eigenvector centrality, poorer households are slightly more likely to receive a cash grant
nomination.
Cash grant nominations are characterized by homophily. Similar to what we observed with
targeting assistant nominations, Table 1.13
Similar to our specication in Equation 1.2, we use the following regression specication to
test for homophily in cash grant nominations, where TA i has a 1× 6 vector of k characteristics.
The dependent variable is the kth characteristic, Xj,k, of the nominated household j. We include
a term, NominatedTAi, to indicate if the targeting assistant was nominated at baseline. Also,
we interact the nominated TA indicator with an indicator, Elicitation2, for the “Hard Times”
question used to elicit the cash grant nominee.12 We adjust for νc neighborhood xed eects.
Xj,k =ηNominatedTAi + ρElicitation2 + θ(NominatedTAi × Elicitation2)
+Xiβ + νc + i
(1.9)
Panel A of Table 1.13 shows regression results from the Equation 1.9 specication. Across
all household characteristics, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that cash grant nominees from
nominated and un-nominated TAs were equivalent. We also fail to reject the null hypothesis that
the two elicitation prompts, “Best Use” and “Hard Times”, yield equivalent cash grant nominees.
We see that TAs demonstrated homophily across all six dimensions. The Predicted PCE Rank of
the TA is positively correlated with the predicted expenditures of the cash grant nominee. Women
were twelve percentage points more likely to nominate another woman to receive a cash grant.
Christian TAs were 36 percentage points more likely to nominate another Christian household
to receive a cash grant. One standard deviation increase in the eigenvector centrality of the TA
12In Table A.1.10 we restrict the sample of cash grant nominations to the rst nominee elicited from each Targeting
Assistant. The order of the elicitation question was randomly determined.
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is associated with a 0.12 unit increase in the eigenvector centrality of the cash grant nominee.
We also observe positive correlations between years in the community of the TA and the cash
grant nominee and whether or not both households include a community leader. However, we
have weaker evidence to reject the null hypothesis; these homophily coecients for years in the
community and leadership have p-values of 0.06 and 0.08, respectively.
We do not observe any clear relationship between the TA type and whether the nominated cash
grantee experienced a shock. Likewise, the “Hard Times” prompt did not result in nominees that
were more likely to have experienced a shock. The “Hard Times” elicitation prompt increased the
social distance between the TA and the cash grant nominee among nominated and un-nominated
TAs. However, this result only holds when we include all cash grant nominees (Table A.1.10 shows
regression results for the rst cash grant nominated by the TA.)
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Table 1.12: Welfare and Social Network Summary Statistics, by Cash Transfer Nomination
Any Nomination Any ‘Best Use’ Nomination Any ‘Hard Times’ Nomination
No Yes p-value No Yes p-value No Yes p-valueN=2163 N=493 N=2348 N=308 N=2372 N=284
Welfare:
Household expenditures (LD) 899 (863) 969 (968) 0.156 897 (865) 1023 (1011) 0.042 917 (887) 891 (882) 0.650
Per capita expenditures (LD) 268 (298) 229 (222) 0.002 263 (291) 234 (235) 0.050 265 (293) 218 (204) 0.001
Predicted PCE (LD) 172 (90.2) 160 (87.1) 0.006 171 (90.7) 160 (81.6) 0.033 171 (89.4) 157 (92.0) 0.016
Household rents dwelling 0.73 (0.44) 0.62 (0.49) <0.001 0.72 (0.45) 0.61 (0.49) <0.001 0.72 (0.45) 0.60 (0.49) <0.001
Number of rooms in dwelling 1.51 (1.12) 1.61 (1.11) 0.068 1.51 (1.11) 1.68 (1.16) 0.018 1.53 (1.13) 1.55 (1.04) 0.777
Proxy means score 54.4 (14.5) 51.8 (14.6) 0.001 54.1 (14.5) 52.1 (14.9) 0.034 54.4 (14.6) 50.2 (14.1) <0.001
Cantril ladder (1–5) 2.33 (1.08) 2.27 (1.18) 0.337 2.31 (1.09) 2.34 (1.19) 0.713 2.34 (1.10) 2.17 (1.14) 0.019
Meals per day 1.81 (0.71) 1.69 (0.67) 0.001 1.79 (0.70) 1.75 (0.68) 0.292 1.81 (0.70) 1.62 (0.65) <0.001
Any shock in past 12 months 0.69 (0.46) 0.64 (0.48) 0.037 0.69 (0.46) 0.62 (0.49) 0.022 0.68 (0.47) 0.67 (0.47) 0.789
Wealth shock in past 12 months 0.50 (0.50) 0.49 (0.50) 0.531 0.51 (0.50) 0.46 (0.50) 0.129 0.50 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50) 0.631
Health shock in past 12 months 0.32 (0.46) 0.35 (0.48) 0.208 0.32 (0.46) 0.36 (0.48) 0.098 0.31 (0.46) 0.37 (0.48) 0.071
Demographic/Social:
Household Size 4.24 (2.58) 5.04 (2.73) <0.001 4.29 (2.58) 5.21 (2.82) <0.001 4.32 (2.60) 5.04 (2.78) <0.001
Household head is female 0.24 (0.42) 0.32 (0.47) <0.001 0.25 (0.43) 0.31 (0.46) 0.026 0.24 (0.43) 0.38 (0.49) <0.001
Years in community 9.31 (10.3) 13.0 (12.2) <0.001 9.54 (10.4) 13.6 (12.9) <0.001 9.61 (10.5) 13.5 (12.4) <0.001
Household includes leader 0.13 (0.34) 0.18 (0.39) 0.005 0.13 (0.34) 0.19 (0.39) 0.024 0.14 (0.34) 0.18 (0.38) 0.075
Religion is Christian 0.69 (0.46) 0.80 (0.40) <0.001 0.69 (0.46) 0.83 (0.38) <0.001 0.70 (0.46) 0.78 (0.41) 0.004
In-degree centrality 2.45 (2.71) 4.55 (3.76) <0.001 2.55 (2.78) 5.05 (3.93) <0.001 2.68 (2.94) 4.23 (3.55) <0.001
Betweenness centrality 240 (379) 411 (501) <0.001 250 (395) 437 (482) <0.001 258 (397) 391 (491) <0.001
Eigenvector centrality 0.11 (0.16) 0.20 (0.23) <0.001 0.11 (0.16) 0.21 (0.24) <0.001 0.12 (0.17) 0.19 (0.23) <0.001
Cash Grant nominations:
‘Best use’ cash nominations 0.00 (0.00) 0.71 (0.64) <0.001 0.00 (0.00) 1.13 (0.42) <0.001 0.09 (0.31) 0.44 (0.71) <0.001
‘Hard times’ cash nominations 0.00 (0.00) 0.69 (0.70) <0.001 0.09 (0.34) 0.41 (0.67) <0.001 0.00 (0.00) 1.20 (0.50) <0.001
‘Best Use’ elicitation question: “Think of households within this neighborhood, which household would make the most out of a USD$100 cash grant?”
‘Hard Times’ elicitation question: “Within this neighborhood, is there a household who recently fell on hard times and would benet most from a USD$100 cash grant?”
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Table 1.13: Homophily in Cash Grant Nominations
(A)
Nominee Characteristics
(B)
Nominee Shocks
(C)
Dyadic Distance
Pred. PCE
Rank Female
Years in
Community Leader Christian
Eigenvector
Centrality
Wealth
Shock
Health
Shock
Social
Distance
Geographic
Distance
TA Type and Prompt:
Nominated TA (ν) −21.52 −0.07 0.80 −0.05 −0.01 −0.03 −0.00 0.08 −0.12 6.82
(93.80) (0.06) (1.53) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.14) (5.11)
Hard Times Elicitation (ρ) −126.97 −0.00 1.24 −0.05 −0.03 −0.02 0.04 0.00 0.37∗ 9.58
(104.88) (0.06) (1.62) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.17) (7.45)
Nominated TA * Hard Times (θ) 115.14 0.06 −2.64 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 −0.11 −3.31
(131.85) (0.08) (2.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.20) (9.45)
Nominating TA Characteristics:
Predicted PCE Rank (β1) 0.13∗∗ −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female (β2) −34.68 0.12∗∗ 1.93 0.01 0.04 −0.01 0.01 0.11∗∗ 0.21∗ 2.28
(67.15) (0.04) (1.10) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10) (4.63)
Years in comm. (SD) (β3) 6.45 −0.01 1.18 0.01 0.03∗ −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.06 −1.18
(32.24) (0.02) (0.62) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (2.23)
Leader (β4) 1.41 −0.01 −0.41 0.07 −0.03 −0.02 0.02 0.02 0.20 −2.51
(77.04) (0.04) (1.25) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (4.28)
Christian (β5) −80.09 −0.06 0.70 −0.00 0.36∗∗∗ −0.02 0.07 0.03 −0.19 −4.56
(82.68) (0.05) (1.28) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (5.69)
Eigenvector (SD) (β6) −6.58 −0.03 −0.12 0.00 0.01 0.12∗∗∗ 0.01 0.01 −0.10∗ −4.44∗
(31.78) (0.02) (0.56) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (1.94)
Adj. R2 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.24 0.31 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.08
Num. obs. 613 613 588 613 597 613 597 597 599 613
ρ+ θ = 0 (p-value) 0.88 0.21 0.27 0.89 0.36 0.36 0.25 0.86 0.015 0.27
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses. Neighborhood xed eects included. Nominated TA is a binary variable
equal to one if the Targeting Assistant was nominated by another community member. Targeting assistants were asked to provide two nominations for a cash grant. We elicited the
cash grant nominations through two independent questions. ‘Best Use’ elicitation question (reference group in table): “Think of households within this neighborhood, which
household would make the most out of a USD$100 cash grant?” ‘Hard Times’ elicitation question: “Within this neighborhood, is there a household who recently fell on hard times
and would benet most from a USD$100 cash grant?” The order of the two elicitation questions was randomized for each Targeting Assistant. Table A.1.10 shows regression results
restrict to the rst nominee elicited from each Targeting Assistant. Predicted PCE Rank is the household ranking of the per capita expenditures as predicted by our random forest
algorithm, centered at zero. Social Distance is the shortest path between the nominating and nominated household as calculated using social network data from the baseline.
Geographic distance is the number of meters between the nominating and nominated household’s dwelling as measured by the spherical geodesic distance between the
latitude-longitude coordinates of the dwellings.
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Do cash grants impact welfare and entrepreneurial outcomes?
Utilizing the matched-pairs randomization design, we sought to measure treatment eects of
the cash transfer on outcomes related to household expenditure, welfare, and business activity.
Table 1.14 shows that the treatment and control groups were well balanced across baseline char-
acteristics.13 We nd that this is evidence of a proper randomized assignment.
Our preferred method of estimating treatment eects is a dierences-in-means estimand strat-
ied by matched pairs. The dierence-in-means estimator provides an unbiased estimate of the
average treatment eect. With matched pairs, the average treatment eect, τ̂ , is simply the
within-pair dierence between outcomes for the treatment and control averaged over all pairs.
Equation 1.10 lays out the calculation for the dierence-in-means estimator, where J is the num-
ber of matched pairs, N is the total number of households, and τ̂j is the estimated dierence
between the mean of the treatment and control household in the jth matched pair. The standard
error, ŜE(τ̂), is estimated using Equation 1.11. (Gerber and Green 2012; Imbens and Wooldridge
2009). We do not control for any baseline characteristics in our estimation strategy as baseline
characteristics are indirectly controlled for through the matched-pairs assignment.
τ̂ =
J∑
j=1
2
N
τ̂j (1.10)
ŜE(τ̂) =
1
J(J − 1)
J∑
j=1
(τ̂j − τ̂)2 (1.11)
In the endline survey, we sought to conrm the delivery of the cash transfer. Nearly all —
96 percent — of cash beneciaries recalled receiving the cash transfer. The treatment group was
79 percentage points more likely to report that they received nancial assistance from an NGO.
There is no equivalent eect on the household reporting assistance from the government. Thus,
we note that the receipt of the cash grant was a salient event for the treatment group and they
understood that the cash grant was from a non-governmental organization.
Among the cash grant beneciaries, respondents reported a diverse set of ways that they used
the cash (Figure 1.4). The most common reason was for food expenses (41%). 31.8 percent stated
that they used the cash transfer to start a business or to improve an existing business. 23 percent
said they used the cash to pay for school fees. 19 percent said they spent the money on clothing.
Also, 16 percent said that they saved part or all of the USD$80 provided through the cash transfer
from IPA.
While it is conrming that the treatment households report that they received the cash transfer
through an NGO, these treatment eects are mechanical and expected. What we are interested in
are treatment eects on household behaviors. Table 1.15 displays dierence-in-means estimates
for the four main outcomes of interest. For each outcome, we display the pooled dierence-in-
means estimates using all matched pairs. The “No Nomination” row of the table displays the
13The one characteristic where we reject the null hypothesis for equality of means is whether or not a household
rents its dwelling. The treatment group is more likely to be a renter.
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Table 1.14: Baseline Summary Statistics, by Treatment Group
(1) (2) (3)
Control Treatment p-valueN=280 N=280
Welfare:
Household expenditure (LD) 858.30 (730.39) 901.22 (1048.76) 0.58
Per capita expenditure (LD) 202.81 (174.11) 210.78 (215.20) 0.63
Predicted PCE (LD) 149.32 (71.02) 147.04 (67.11) 0.70
Household rents dwelling 0.63 (0.48) 0.71 (0.46) 0.06
Number of rooms in dwelling 1.59 (1.20) 1.46 (1.01) 0.16
Proxy means score 46.68 (14.92) 46.54 (15.12) 0.91
Cantril ladder (1–5) 2.18 (1.12) 2.19 (1.19) 0.96
Meals per day 1.68 (0.67) 1.65 (0.67) 0.62
Any shock in past 12 months 0.67 (0.47) 0.66 (0.47) 0.93
Wealth shock in past 12 months 0.49 (0.50) 0.54 (0.50) 0.25
Health shock in past 12 months 0.37 (0.48) 0.33 (0.47) 0.37
Demographic/Social:
Household size 4.82 (2.30) 4.80 (2.23) 0.92
Household head is female 0.31 (0.47) 0.31 (0.46) 0.93
Years in community 10.44 (10.01) 10.15 (9.76) 0.74
Household includes community leader 0.14 (0.35) 0.13 (0.34) 0.71
Religion is Christian 0.75 (0.43) 0.76 (0.43) 0.79
In-degree centrality 3.45 (2.95) 3.70 (3.16) 0.33
Betweenness centrality 275.19 (360.17) 313.28 (378.48) 0.22
Eigenvector centrality 0.16 (0.20) 0.17 (0.20) 0.62
# Family assistance 0.79 (1.07) 0.86 (1.23) 0.48
# Friends assistance 0.70 (1.09) 0.63 (1.05) 0.42
Government assistance 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.09) 0.65
NGO assistance 0.03 (0.16) 0.02 (0.13) 0.55
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. P-value is derived from the t-test for equality of treatment and control means.
dierence-in-means estimates for the 69 matched pairs that did not receive a nomination, i.e.
were randomly sampled from the poorest quintile of the proxy-means score distribution. The
“Best Use” row uses the 78 matched pairs that were nominated using the “Best Use” elicitation
prompt in the TA survey. The “Hard Times” row uses the 75 matched pairs that were nominated
using the “Hard Times” elicitation prompt in the TA survey.
Panel A of Table 1.15 shows the eects of the cash grant on per capita expenditures. Across
all sub-samples—as well as the pooled estimate—we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the cash
grant had zero impact on per capita expenditures. Panel B shows that, likewise, we do not observe
any statistically signicant impacts on household savings.
In Panel C of Table 1.15, we observe that the cash grant led to a decrease in nancial satisfac-
tion.14 The estimate, however, does not survive Bonferroni for the four hypotheses that we test
under this outcome.
During the endline survey, we asked households about business activities. Panel D of Table 1.15
shows our dierence-in-means estimates for whether or not a household has an active business in
operation. We see that those assigned to receive a cash transfer were more likely to be operating a
14Financial satisfaction is a dummy variable equal to one for the ‘Satised’ and ‘Very Satised’ responses to the
question, “How satised are you personally with the nancial situation of your household?”
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Figure 1.4: Reported Use of Cash Grant. Multiple responses permitted, thus values do not sum
to one.
business (p-value = 0.08). This eect is highest among cash beneciaries that were not nominated
through the TA survey, the coecient on the “No Nomination” group survives a Bonferroni
adjustment for four hypotheses at the 0.05 signicance level.
Taken together, our results do not suggest that the cash grant impacted welfare and busi-
ness activities in a clear and systematic manner. Moreover, there is no evidence that leveraging
nominations directed cash grants towards households that would have a higher impact.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper analyses data from a multi-stage experimental approach to targeting a social program.
This paper provides novel data to understand individual preferences for targeting social programs.
Whereas previous work has focused on algorithmic approaches to identifying poor households in
comparison to community targeting, we present evidence to help decipher individual perceptions
of knowledge within a neighborhood social network.
Using data collected from over 2000 households in 13 densely-populated urban neighborhoods
in Monrovia, Liberia, we developed a novel approach to estimating household welfare by training
a random forest model with expenditure and asset data from households. We show that predicted
CHAPTER 1. LEVERAGING SOCIAL CONNECTIONS 38
Table 1.15: Cash Grant Treatment Eects
τ̂ (ŜE(τ̂)) p-value 95% CI
Panel A: Per capita Expenditures
Pooled 5.75 (11.09) 0.60 [-16.11, 27.60]
No Nomination 9.13 (19.99) 0.65 [-30.76, 49.01]
Best Use -21.04 (17.29) 0.23 [-55.47, 13.39]
Hard Times 30.49 (20.18) 0.14 [-9.73, 70.71]
Panel B: Household Savings
Pooled -69.01 (60.67) 0.26 [-188.56, 50.55]
No Nomination -201.07 (189.17) 0.29 [-578.56, 176.42]
Best Use -26.11 (37.60) 0.49 [-100.97, 48.75]
Hard Times 7.88 (20.70) 0.70 [-33.36, 49.12]
Panel C: Satised with HH Financial Situation
Pooled -0.05 (0.05) 0.33 [-0.14, 0.05]
No Nomination -0.19 (0.08) 0.02 [-0.35, -0.03]
Best Use 0.10 (0.08) 0.21 [-0.06, 0.26]
Hard Times -0.07 (0.07) 0.37 [-0.21, 0.08]
Panel D: Has Active Business
Pooled 0.08 (0.05) 0.08 [-0.01, 0.17]
No Nomination 0.22 (0.08) 0.01 [0.05, 0.39]
Best Use 0.09 (0.07) 0.21 [-0.05, 0.23]
Hard Times -0.05 (0.08) 0.51 [-0.21, 0.11]
Notes: Dierence-in-means estimator with matched pairs shown in the column 1. Eicker-Huber-White robust
standard errors in parentheses. Degrees of freedom: Pooled = 221, No Nomination = 68, Best Use = 77, Hard
Times = 74.
expenditures through this measure yield a meaningful indicator of household welfare across a
host of measures.
We found that targeting through social network leads to a high proportion of nominations
dened by homophily. Principals nominate agents that are similar to them across a vector of
six characteristics. This holds at two stages of our analysis, when nominating knowledgeable
individuals within the neighborhood and when nominating cash grant recipients.
We found that social distance is important in the accuracy of information provided by agents
(targeting assistants). Agents provide more accurate information in targeting poor neighbors if
the neighbor is a one-degree distance from the agent on the social network. However, agents
provide inaccurate information when their rst-degree neighbor is not poor. Agents that were
nominated by others (Nominated TAs) are particularly good at minimizing exclusion error and
particularly bad at minimizing inclusion error.
Cash grants targeted through a decentralized system do indeed go to poorer households. On
average, those nominated for a cash grant are poorer than those households that are not nomi-
nated. We do not observe any evidence that agents direct the cash grants to households that have
experienced a shock.
We believe that the evidence presented in this paper can help to understand the role that
social networks in setting preferences for targeting of social programs. This is particularly true in
urban neighborhoods. As targeting of social programs in urban areas gains importance, a better
understanding of social networks is important to best design mechanisms for targeting social
programs that leverage social connections.
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Chapter Two
Demographics, Social Networks,
and Mobile Phone Usage
Introduction and Take up of Community Cellular
Networks in the Philippines
Abstract
We investigate the determinants of cellular network adoption in the context of remote locations of
the Philippines. We leverage unique circumstances where all households in seven localities were
interviewed before the installation of cellular network towers. We link rich socio-economic as well
as social network data to call detail records from the rst ve months after community cellular
networks were introduced. First, we show that 68 percent of households owned a cellphone before
the cellular network installation, although other channels were much more commonly used as
sources of information. Second, we examine and attempt to explain variance in network usage
across the seven localities. Finally, we provide a unique descriptive analysis of social and economic
factors that correlate with cellular network adoption. We nd that network adoption and volume
are correlated with the wealth of the household. A one-standard-deviation increase in the wealth
of a household is associated with a 3 percentage point increase in cellular network adoption.
Farming and Fishing households are particularly likely to join the cellular network. Wealthy
households also record more transactions (calls and texts) on the network. Also, households with
higher levels of education make and receive more text messages. Our results contribute to the
literature on cellular networks by revealing household-level characteristics that should be taken
into consideration as “last-mile” ICT interventions are considered.†
†The material in this chapter is based on joint work with Joshua Blumenstock, Arman Rezaee, and Erin Troland.
Innovations for Poverty Action conducted the data collection and project management in the Philippines. A team
from the University of the Philippines installed and managed the community cellular networks.
CHAPTER 2. COMMUNITY CELLULAR NETWORKS 40
2.1 Introduction
More than 5 billion people have mobile phone subscriptions, yet the expansion of subscribers
has slowed in recent years. The reduced pace of growth presents a considerable challenge in
the pursuit of ubiquitous communication systems. One of the Sustainable Development Goals
is to, “Signicantly increase access to information and communications technology and strive
to provide universal and aordable access to the internet in least developed countries by 2020.”1
The World Economic Forum pinpoints a similar goal of “Internet for All” (World Economic Forum
2018). The GSMA points to mobile subscriptions as a predicate to expanding access to phone
and internet communications but cites demographic and geographic challenges to expanding
mobile connections (GSMA 2019). Namely, the GSMA notes that individuals with limited formal
education, low employment potential, and the elderly are less likely to be connected. Rural
households are also disadvantaged due to infrastructural constraints.
To better understand the constraints as well as the potential to expanding ICT connections, it
is worthwhile to examine the constraints and potential for expanding mobile phone access. Much
of the literature on communications networks in developing countries relies on administrative
data and lacks demographic and socio-economic data. Sarker and Wells (2003) provides an early
analysis of cellphone adoption and usage. Shah et al. (2017) discuss characteristics of the phone
used by community cellular network subscribers in the Philippines. Ahmad et al. (2016) also
examine device characteristics of mobile network subscribers on a major network in Pakistan.
Heimerl, Menon, et al. (2015), using call detail records from one community cellular network
in Indonesia, explore the uptake of the network and expansion of smartphones. The studies
mentioned lack detailed socio-economic data to unpack the determinants of mobile phone usage.
We examine access to information prior to the installation of cellular networks in seven re-
mote locations of the Philippines and mobile phone use during the rst ve months of network
service. Resembling the work of Blumenstock and Eagle (2012), Blumenstock (2014), Blumenstock,
Cadamuro, and On (2015), and Blumenstock (2018), we leverage detailed socio-economic survey
data that can be paired with individual-level call detail records (CDR). Unlike previous work in
which survey data and CDR are analyzed, we utilize a detailed social network census to measure
social connections as reported by households with their observed communication activity through
call detail records. As such, the contribution of this paper is to examine demographic, economic,
and social characteristics that correlate with mobile phone usage prior to and after the installation
of cellular networks.
We structure our presentation as follows. First, we discuss the broad communications land-
scape in the Philippines. Next, we describe the installation of an innovative approach to expanding
phone coverage, the Community Cellular Network. Between September 2017 and January 2019,
seven new networks were installed in remote areas of the Philippines. We discuss the selection of
sites as well as demographic characteristics of households in the sites. In Section 2.2, we describe
our primary data sources, namely baseline survey data from all households and call detail records
from all phone transactions in the rst ve months of the cellular networks. In Section 2.3, we
1sustainabledevelopment.un.org
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provide a detailed descriptive analysis of household demographics, economic welfare, and social
network position at the time of the baseline survey. We show that phone owners dier from
non-phone owners before the launch of cellular networks. In Section 2.4, we discuss details of the
network installations and registration of mobile subscribers. In Section 2.5 we provide a descrip-
tive analysis of network take up for each of the seven sites. We also examine the determinants of
network usage by households. We provide a discussion of the ndings and broader relevance in
Section 2.6.
Communications in the Philippines
The Philippines provides an ideal setting to study Community Cellular Networks. The country
is an archipelago composed of about 7,641 mountainous islands. The topology of the Philippines
results in thousands of localities that are isolated from other parts of the country. Much of this
country faces the “last mile” connectivity gap. This gap is caused by the fact that telecommu-
nications companies have not found it commercially viable to bring cellular towers to many of
the country’s small, remote islands nor to the mountainous, coastal regions of its larger islands.
Approximately 63 percent of the Philippines population subscribe to a mobile network operating
system, leaving over 25 million people disconnected (GSMA 2018).
Community Cellular Networks
This paper contributes to a burgeoning literature on low-cost mobile phone networks in rural
areas of the world. Originally developed by Heimerl and Brewer (2010) and named the Village
Base Station (VBTS), the network installation provides four main benets:
• exible, low-power deployment requirements that leverage local power generation via solar
or wind;
• support for local services within the locality with the potential to run autonomously;
• power/coverage optimization to minimize loss of coverage; and
• a portfolio of data and voice services.
For the purposes of this study, a VBTS provides a practical, open-source technology (both
hardware and software) that can be implemented to create Community Cellular Networks (CCN) in
remote, o-the-grid localities in the Philippines. This technology was adapted for the Philippines
by a team of researchers from the University of the Philippines (UP), University of Washington,
and University of California Berkeley (Barela et al. 2016), with the regulatory support of a national
mobile network operator, Globe. This process included hardware procurement and fabrication,
software design and integration, site selection, engineering and construction of towers and solar
grids for VBTS boxes in these sites, working with the major telecommunications company and
satellite connection providers, and mobilizing local communities to maintain a CCN. The literature
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on the CCN technology focuses on the hardware and software systems (Barela et al. 2016; Hasan et
al. 2019; Heimerl and Brewer 2010; Heimerl, Hasan, et al. 2013; Jang et al. 2018). Our concentration
in this paper is on the descriptive analysis of social and economic factors that correlate with the
adoption and usage of CCNs.
Figure 2.1: Project Sites
Site Identication
As described in Barela et al. (2016), we identied candidate sites for CCNs in the Philippines—
areas that were both remote enough to lack cellular network coverage but not so remote as to
make the logistics of research infeasible. In each potential site, the team from UPD conducted
spectrum analysis to assess the existence and quality of cellular network signal as well as any
potential topographical features that could pose a challenge to implementing a community cellular
network. We identied fourteen candidate sites along the west coast of Luzon, the largest island
in the Philippines. All sites are located in Aurora Province. Sites are villages, or “sitios” using
the Philippines term for the lowest-level administrative unit, located near or along the coast. The
localities where this study was conducted has some of the highest poverty rates in the country.
The coastal and mountainous terrain make mobile connectivity dicult. Many of the potential
sites are located in sea coves only accessible by boat. Aurora is located within a path frequently
hit by typhoons. During typhoon season, coves are often inaccessible for multiple days.
From the original fourteen candidate sites, seven were randomly selected to receive a CCN
tower. In this paper, we focus our analysis on the seven project sites that received a CCN tower.2
2For more details on the randomized controlled trial, see Blumenstock, Keleher, et al. (2019).
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Figure 2.1 shows the location of the seven selected sites as well as the location of the region within
the Philippines. The main regional town in the area, Baler, is a multiple hour commute by bus or
boat from the project sites. Each candidate site was deemed able to support a CCN. CCN base
stations transmit to a 500-meter radius, though terrain often cuts this distance. Field teams visited
all potential sites to verify eligibility (no current cellular connection), determine possible logistics,
and meet with local government units (LGUs). We then randomly selected seven sites that would
receive an initial installation of a CCN tower. Figure 2.1 shows the location of the seven sites that
were selected to receive a Community Cellular Network tower.
2.2 Data
Survey Data
Prior to the installation of CCN towers, we interviewed adults from all households in the selected
rural localities of Aurora Province. Among the seven CCN sites, 1,131 households were inter-
viewed at baseline.3 The household survey consisted of modules about household demographic
composition, asset ownership, and economic activity. To participate in the study, we asked for
voluntary consent from all survey respondents.
Table 2.1 provides site-level population counts. Sites range from 50 to 382 households. On
average, there is one child under the age of 15 for every two adults living within the study
population. In total, we listed 3,057 adults out of which we conducted 1,617 one-on-one surveys.
The core modules contained within the adult survey were a travel diary and a social network
module. Women comprise 62 percent of the adult survey respondents. In sum, before CCN tower
installation, we surveyed all household living in the seven CCN project sites and 53 percent of all
adults.
Table 2.1: Site Information
Population Social Network
VBTS Site Households Adults Children HH OwnsPhone Edges
Largest
Component Density
Avg.
Clustering
Avg.
Distance
Site 1 88 215 146 0.80 390 87 0.10 0.33 3.09
Site 2 382 1103 787 0.69 2354 381 0.03 0.37 2.34
Site 3 176 495 312 0.47 919 175 0.06 0.31 3.20
Site 4 100 251 159 0.57 288 95 0.06 0.25 3.50
Site 5 255 646 371 0.85 1777 255 0.05 0.41 2.22
Site 6 50 128 85 0.58 163 50 0.13 0.27 2.63
Site 7 80 219 139 0.62 282 78 0.09 0.18 2.58
Phone ownership varies across sites. We show in Table 2.1 that even in the absence of cellphone
service in the site many households own a cellphone. In two sites, more than 80 percent of
3In total, we collected baseline data from 2,370 households across the fourteen sites included in the randomized
controlled trial.
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households owned a cellphone at the time of the baseline survey. In only one site, Site 3, was
phone ownership below 50 percent of households.
We took painstaking eorts to identify local and non-local social network ties at the time of
the baseline survey. For local social networks, we asked respondents that participated in the adult
survey to name their closest friends and family that lived in the same barangay. We then matched
the names of their contacts with names from our household listing. Using these data, we were able
to construct a social network graph for each site to identify social linkages, or “edges”, between
households. In total, we were able to identify 6,173 edges among the 1,131 households. As shown
in Table 2.1, most households are included in the largest component of the social network graph.
Between 95 and 100 percent of households can be reached via connections in the social network.
The density of the social network graph—that is the fraction potential links that are present—is
low but on par with social network data from other settings (See Alatas et al. (2016) and Bloch and
Olckers (2018)). Average social distance, that is the shortest path between any two households,
in each site ranges between 2.2 and 3.5 steps.
Call Detail Records
Once a cellular network launched, all cellular transactions were logged for the CCN. In this paper,
we work with the raw Call Detail Records (CDR) from the seven CCN sites. SIM cards were
assigned to all adults living in the site. We provide details of the SIM assignments in Section 2.4.
We were able to link each adult to a unique record from the baseline survey data. CDR include an
identier for the initiating and receiving parties, the type of transaction, the date-time, the tower
used, the cost of the transaction, and the duration of calls. We limit our analysis to call and text
message transactions in the rst 144 days of the CCN in each site. We limit our analysis to this
period for two main reasons. First, we want to focus on the adoption of the mobile network, thus
we concentrate on the earliest period of the network. Second, the dates of CCN launches were
staggered for logistical reasons. The last CCN tower was installed in January 2019. Restricting
our analysis to the rst 144 days of each site maximizes our window of time for this last site while
also creating a uniform period of time to examine each CCN site.
We also limit our analysis to phone calls and text messages. We drop invalid calls and texts as
well as text messages sent to special codes (i.e. to check account balance). In total, 952,876 phone
calls and text messages were sent or received by CCN subscribers in the rst 144 days of tower
activity across all seven CCN sites.
2.3 Information Networks prior to
installation
Panel A of Table 2.2 shows demographic, welfare, asset ownership, and social network character-
istics of households before the launch of the CCN. Households comprise, on average, 2.7 adults
and 1.8 children under the age of 15. One-third of household heads are women. One-quarter of
household heads have a secondary school degree.
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Economic activity and sources of income were mixed. One-quarter of adults did not work in
the week preceding the baseline interview. The majority of residents lived and worked within
the sitio. Only 25 percent of adults traveled outside of their sitio for work in the twelve months
preceding the baseline interview. Individuals do, however, travel for non-work reasons. Half of
all adults expected to travel outside the sitio in the 12 months following the baseline interview.
Electricity coverage was fairly widespread, with 63 percent of households having access to
some form of electricity. Communication technologies were, however, observed in fewer house-
holds. 32 percent of households owned a radio, 52 percent owned a television, and 31 percent
owned a satellite dish.
To estimate household welfare, we constructed two commonly-used metrics for assessing the
relative wealth of households. First, we included questions from the Poverty Probability Index
(PPI) Scorecard.4 The PPI scorecard is a set of ten questions that, when considered together, are
most predictive of per capita expenditures (see Kshirsagar et al. (2017) for discussion of the PPI
methodology). The ten questions from the PPI scorecard can be found in Appendix Section B.
The PPI score indicates the probability of a household being below the poverty line. Lower scores
indicate that a household is more likely to fall below the poverty line. Among the seven CCN
sites, the mean household has a PPI score of 42.17, which translates to a 56.4 percent probability
that an individual in the mean household lives on less than USD$2.50 per day.
As our second measure of household welfare, we calculate an asset wealth index using the rst
component of a principal component analysis of 14 asset questions in the baseline household sur-
vey.5 The rst component has been shown to be a reliable predictor of household socio-economic
status (Filmer and Pritchett 2001). Several of our asset variables are categorical factor variables;
thus, we follow the suggestion of Kolenikov and Angeles (2009) by using the polychoric correla-
tion matrix in the principal component analysis. The Pearson correlation coecient between the
PPI score and the PCA wealth index is 0.55.
Despite the lack of mobile network access prior to the CCN installation, the majority (68%) of
households owned a cellphone and a SIM card (64%). On average, households owned 1.2 phones
and 1.3 SIM cards. There are two major mobile network operators in the Philippines. One-quarter
of households owned a SIM card from Globe while 55 percent had a SIM card from the Smart
network6. To use the SIM card, people need to travel outside of the sitio. The CCN provided, for
the rst time, reliable local cellular network service within the localities.
Using the social network data that was collected in the adult survey, we construct two measures
of social importance for each household. First, we calculate the in-degree centrality of a household
by summing the number of times members of a household were named as a close friend or family
member by others during the baseline adult survey. Second, we compute the eigenvector centrality
of each household, which is a measure of the position of a social network node that accounts for
4https://www.povertyindex.org/country/philippines
5The 14 assets used in the principal component analysis were: land ownership (0/1), number of rooms in the
dwelling, access to electricity in the dwelling (0/1), wall type, roof type, oor type, and ownership (0/1) of sala sets,
refrigerator, television set, video player, radio, satellite dish, vehicle, and gas stove.
6The two largest mobile network operators have dual-branded cellular network oerings. Globe includes the
Globe and Touch Mobile (TM) SIM cards. Smart includes Smart and TNT SIM cards.
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the centrality of nodes that are connected to it. Thus, households with high eigenvector centrality
are connected to central households, which are connected to central households, and so on.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.2 provide comparative statistics for households that reported phone
ownership versus those that said they did not own a phone at the time of the baseline survey. As
seen in these columns, households that did not own a phone dier signicantly from those that do.
In addition to not owning a phone, asset ownership was lower for all of the main assets that we
asked about. Households without phones ranked lower on both welfare scores and are less likely
to have a bank account. However, these households were no less central to social networks in the
sites. Households that lacked a cellphone were equally likely to have a family member in political
oce and were equally, if not more, central to the social network — we fail to reject the null
hypothesis that in-degree centrality is equivalent but reject the null that eigenvector centrality is
equivalent. Adults in households without phones were no less likely to report social ties inside
the barangay.
Phone ownership correlates with non-local communication networks. Adults from households
that owned a phone reported that they traveled outside their barangay more than adults from
households lacking a phone. Phone owners were more likely to have close friends outside of the
barangay. Also, phone owners stated that they were more likely to communicate with family
outside of the barangay in case of emergency.
Before the CCN launch, in-person communications and television were dominant sources of
information about daily events in the Philippines (see Figure 2.2). More than 60 percent of adult
survey respondents stated that they spoke with friends and family and watched television on
a daily basis to learn about events and developments in the Philippines and around the world.
Nearly 90 percent of households receive information from these sources on a weekly or more
frequent basis. As shown in Figure 2.2, the majority of households reported that they never
received information via mobile phone prior to the baseline survey.
Figure 2.2: Sources of Information
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2.4 Installation of Community Cellular
Networks
CCN Installations and Launch
After the conclusion of the baseline survey, the team from the University of the Philippines Diliman
(UP) initiated activities to install the CCN towers. The schedule of installation was staggard for
logistical reasons and the order of tower installation was randomized.
The UP team met with local community cooperatives to identify key contacts for managing the
community cellular networks. They also received the appropriate permissions from administrative
leaders, regulatory bodies, and the leading telecommunications company through which the
cellular network would receive spectrum. A team of engineers installed towers and solar panels
to provide power to the CCN tower in central locations of each site to maximize coverage. The
UP team ran network tests to conrm that the tower worked adequately. Also, they trained a
select group of local community members to use and maintain the tower. Finally, they designated
local vendors to sell phone credit, “e-load.” After the construction of the CCN tower, we organized
launch and registration events in each site. For the project, the CCNs were referred to as the VBTS
Konekt Network.7
The VBTS Konekt launch was a signicant event for each locality. Several days in advance of
the registration event, we informed each community of the scheduled launch of the new cellular
network. Prior to doing so, we obtained local authorization and agreement on the date and
time of the community registration event. With assistance from local ocials such as kagawads,
barangay tanods, sitio/purok, leaders, or tribal council members, we established the date, time, and
location for the community registration event. The local leaders were responsible for identifying
barangay representatives to assist in spreading the word about the community registration event.
Community members were informed that any residents, 15 years of age or older, would be able
to collect one free SIM card at the registration.
At the community registration event, we explained the purpose and motivation for the com-
munity cellular network. Community members were informed that the towers were part of a
research project and the towers would not necessarily remain beyond the duration of the research
study. We described how to use VBTS Konekt and details for utilizing the SIM cards.
Residents that attended the community registration event were then asked to register and
activate their SIM cards. A team of registration enumerators from Innovations for Poverty Action
veried the identity of individuals interested in activating a VBTS Konekt SIM card.
For each customer, a registration sta member explained the steps to activate a SIM card (see
Appendix Section B for the script that was followed). VBTS Konekt SIM cards were provided
for free to customers. To be eligible for a SIM card, a customer needed to have a functioning
GSM 900 or multi-band cellphone. No phones were provided to customers by the research team.
Customers were read the user agreement (see Appendix Section B) and required to accept the
terms of the agreement before receiving their SIM card. Registration sta assisted customers to
7VBTS stands for Village Base Station.
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activate their SIM card and inform them of their unique phone number (MSISDN). SIM cards
could be replaced if they were lost or malfunctioned in which case the customer would retain the
same phone number in the event of a SIM replacement. Additional SIM cards could be bought for
15 Pesos.
Using the baseline survey data, we assigned a SIM card to every adult in CCN sites. The unique
phone number was assigned to an IMSI subscriber identier which was in turn linked to a unique
identier from the baseline household survey. When an interested customer was unidentied in
the baseline survey database, we required a household visit to conrm that the individual was a
resident of the treatment site. SIM cards were provided at no charge to the subscriber.
The VBTS Konekt Network allowed for calls to and from other mobile and landline phones
within the Philippines. Text messages were limited to the local Konekt network and long-distance
on-network phone numbers in the Philippines. Table 2.3 provides the schedule of taris for all
network interaction types. Local calls and texts were the lowest cost, on-network long-distance
calls and texts were billed at a higher rate than local interactions, and o-network interactions
were the most costly. All incoming calls and texts were free of charge to the customer; how-
ever, the calling party for incoming calls and texts were charged at standard long-distance rates.
Due to regulatory restrictions, texts from o-network numbers could not be received. Similarly,
international transactions were prohibited on the VBTS Konekt Network.
Customers were informed that they could purchase phone credit through retailers based within
the site. Each site had between one and three retailers. To promote the take-up of the network
and encourage customers to try the network, all customers that activated their SIM card received
ve free text messages. Customers were also informed that promotions might be oered to them
at a later date.
Following the launch event, UP network administrators enabled the cellular network for all
activated SIM cards. The network could only work through VBTS Konekt SIM cards. Customers
could purchase phone credit directly through local retailers.
2.5 Mobile Network Adoption
Site-level Network Usage
Figure 2.3 shows daily calls and text messages for each of the 7 CCN sites. We have shaded the
period of analysis — the rst 144 days after the network launch — in gray. The actual dates when
the periods begin range from September 2017 for Site 1 to January 2019 for Site 7. There is a
clear and marked dierence in site-level usage. Sites 2, 3, and 4 consistently had more than 1,000
transactions per day. Site 7 also shows high activity with over 100 transactions on most days.
In contrast, we observed approximately 100 transactions per day in the rst two weeks of the
network in Sites 1, 5, and 6 that rather quickly decreased to below ten by the third month of the
network.
Table 2.4 provides aggregate statistics of usage in each site during the rst 144 days of service.
Several ndings stand out. Mean usage per household ranges from 10.6 transactions in site 5 to
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178 transactions per household in Site 2. In sites 2, 3, 4, and 7, more than 3 transactions were
logged per household on an average day in the period covered by our analysis. Incoming calls
were much more common than outgoing calls. Incoming calls were also longer in duration as
compared to outgoing calls. However, outgoing texts tended to be more common than incoming
text messages. This pattern of communication comports with practices observed elsewhere in
that low-income households concentrated their network usage on text messages to avoid more
costly phone calls.
In Figure 2.4, we show that sites also diered in their use of local and long-distance commu-
nications. By long distance, we mean any transaction that is outside of the CCN, i.e. to a phone
number that is registered with another mobile network operator. Across all sites, long-distance
communications were more common. In two sites, Sites 1 and 5, local calls and texts were avoided
almost entirely. The solid lines in Figure 2.4 represent incoming transactions while the dashed
line represents outgoing transactions. Local calls and SMS messages are paired; thus, the outgoing
and incoming lines are indistinguishable.
Household-level Network Usage
Nearly two-thirds of households initiated or received at least one call or text message during
the rst 144 days of the cellular network. As shown in Table 2.5, ownership of a phone prior to
the network launch does not explain network adoption across all sites. However, as shown in
Table A.2.2, network adoption ranges from 17 percent of households in site 5 to 94 percent in site
2. Households that reported owning a phone at the time of the baseline survey had, on average,
150 greater transactions than households that did not report phone ownership during the baseline
survey.
Approximately 60 percent of households had at least one outgoing call, one incoming call, one
outgoing text and one incoming text. Most of the dierence in phone transactions by baseline
phone ownership is explained by higher use of text messages by households that owned a phone
prior to the CCN launch. This could be due to a number of factors, including literacy levels that
are correlated with asset wealth as well as digital literacy that might increase comfort in using a
phone to type and read text messages. We do not see any dierences, on average, in outgoing calls
based on previous phone ownership. Households with phones at baseline received more phone
calls, but we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that incoming call volume is equivalent to
that of households that did not own a phone at the time of the baseline.
We now turn to multivariate regression analysis of the determinants of household usage of
the CCN. Table 2.6 shows results from running the regression specication in Equation 2.1. Our
dependent variable, Yi, is one of six quantitative measures of cellular network usage. Each measure
is identied by a column in Table 2.6. Any Transaction is a binary variable that takes the value
of one if a household has at least one transaction (call or text) in the CCN call detail records.
Total Transactions is the count of all incoming and outgoing calls and texts associated with phone
numbers registered to a given household. Out Calls, Out SMS, In Calls, and In SMS correspond to
a similar count at the household level for outgoing calls, outgoing text messages, incoming calls,
and incoming text messages, respectively.
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Yi =β1OwnedPhonei + β2WealthIndexi + β3Contacts
LD
i
+ β4NetCentrality
Local
i + β5HHSizei + β6FemaleHOHi
+ β7SecSchoolHOHi + β8FarmingIncomei + β9FishingIncomei
+ β10WorkOutsideBgyi + β11CogAbilityi
+ νs + i
(2.1)
We include several household characteristics from the baseline survey as covariates in our
regression specication. OwnedPhonei is a dummy variable indicating whether household i
reported owning a phone at the time of the baseline survey. WealthIndexi is the rst component
of the principal component analysis described in Section 2.3. For our regressions, we transform
the wealth index to a standardized value. ContactsLDi is the number of contacts outside the house-
hold’s barangay reported in the adult survey. For households with more than one adult survey,
we use the highest number of contacts reported by an adult in household i. NetCentralityLocali
is a measure of social network centrality using social ties within the site. For our regressions, we
use in-degree centrality; results are similar using eigenvector centrality. HHSizei is the number
of adults and children living in the household. We include a dummy variable, FemaleHOHi,
to indicate if the head of the household is a woman and a dummy variable, SecSchoolHOHi,
that equals one if the head completed secondary school. We include dummy variables for the
primary source of income at baseline. FarmingIncomei and FishingIncomei are equal to one
if the household reports farming or wage labor, respectively, as the primary income source for
the household. We include a dummy variable, WorkOutsideBgyi, equal to one if any member
of the household worked outside of the barangay in the 12 months preceding the baseline survey.
Finally, we include a measure of cognitive ability, CogAbilityi, which is the maximum score from
the rst component of a PCA using three ravens test questions and four numeracy questions. We
also include site xed eects, νs, in all regressions.
In Column 1 of Table 2.6, we see that CCN adoption was correlated with household wealth.
Controlling for other household characteristics and site xed eects, we see that a one standard
deviation increase in the wealth index is correlated with a 3 percentage point increase in network
adoption. Households that reported farming or shing as their main source of income were 10–11
percentage points more likely to adopt the network than other households.
Although we fail to reject the null hypothesis at the 5 percent signicance level, we also see
that households that owned a phone at baseline were ve percentage points more likely to have at
least one transaction on the CCN (p = 0.062). We nd that larger households and female-headed
households were more likely to have used the CCN. The result for female-headed households is
encouraging as it suggests that female headed households were 5 percentage points more likely to
join the cellular network compared to male-headed households, controlling for other covariates.
This indicates a demand that could help to reduce gender barriers to ICT technologies.
When we look at the intensive margin of CCN usage, we observe that wealth and education
are primary determinants of cellular network activity. The household wealth index is positively
correlated with all types of transactions. A one-standard-deviation increase in the wealth index is
associated with 44 additional cellular network transactions. The majority of increased transactions
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come from outgoing and incoming text messages and incoming calls. Put another way a standard
deviation increase in household wealth is associated with one additional outgoing text message
every two weeks and one additional outgoing call every month.
We do not observe any meaningful correlations between non-local and local social network
measures and CCN usage. However, we do observe that in households where the head has a
secondary school degree were more active on the cellular network. These household were notably
more likely to send more text messages. Controlling for the head of household’s education, we
fail to reject the null hypothesis that cognitive ability un-associated with network adoption and
usage.
In summary, we observe several characteristics inuenced whether or not a household partici-
pated in the community cellular network. Foremost among these were the wealth of the household,
the number of people living in the household, the primary income source, and whether the house-
hold head was a woman. However, the volume of network usage was primarily driven by the
wealth of the household. Households where the head has a secondary education displayed higher
text message volumes.
2.6 Discussion and Conclusions
The descriptive analysis presented in this paper provides insight into social networks and eco-
nomic well-being before the installation of cellular towers in seven remote locations of the Philip-
pines. We leverage a unique scenario where we are able to examine economic and social charac-
teristics that correlate with the adoption of the cellular network.
Our ndings point to evidence that most households in the study actively sought out informa-
tion even in the absence of a cellular network, primarily through in-person communications and
television. Moreover, nearly two-thirds of households owned a cellphone despite the absence of
a cellular network signal where they live. Phone ownership is highly correlated with indicators
of wealth and the presence of long-distance social networks.
Take-up of the community cellular networks varied greatly across installation sites. Three
sites displayed anemic usage statistics. Two of the three sites with low usage had phone ownership
rates in excess of 80 percent prior to the CCN installation. We believe that this is a signal that
these sites had easier access to cellular networks prior to the project. In future research, we will
investigate the inuence of network quality on take-up.
Four sites demonstrated rapid take-up and sustained activity. Because this is the largest in-
stallation of CCNs in a research project to date, we believe that the four most successful sites
serve as good examples of how a low-cost cellular network can provide lasting revenue to sustain
operability and involve a wide swath of subscribers.
Furthermore, we highlight several demographic characteristics that deserve attention in the
pursuit of universal access to mobile and internet services. We document critical barriers to the
adoption of the cellular network. We also show that wealth and secondary education are positively
correlated with cellular network use. Female headed households revealed a high demand for the
cellular network, as did households involved in shing and farming. We also nd, though evidence
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is weaker, that the lack of phone ownership was associated with lower probability of transacting
on the cellular network.
We believe that this analysis is an important step towards deciphering the promises and
challenges of expanding cellular networks to the remaining 10% of the world’s population that
currently lacks phone service. Firstly, our analysis shows the promise of expanding cellular
network coverage through low-cost community cellular networks. Secondly, we highlight key
considerations and potential barriers that may limit the ability for households to partake in the
mobile communications revolution.
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Table 2.2: Baseline Summary Statistics, by Phone Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All No Phone Owns Phone
Panel A: Household Summary Statistics N=1131 N=364 N=767 p-value
Adults in household 2.70 (1.29) 2.26 (0.98) 2.91 (1.37) <0.01
Children (0-14) in household 1.77 (1.49) 1.75 (1.61) 1.78 (1.43) 0.76
Female head of household 0.36 (0.48) 0.39 (0.49) 0.35 (0.48) 0.19
HOH - Secondary school 0.27 (0.44) 0.12 (0.33) 0.34 (0.47) <0.01
Rooms in dwelling 1.79 (0.81) 1.60 (0.73) 1.88 (0.83) <0.01
Household owns land 0.45 (0.50) 0.44 (0.50) 0.45 (0.50) 0.70
Family member in political/govt oce 0.21 (0.41) 0.20 (0.40) 0.21 (0.41) 0.57
Household has bank account 0.16 (0.36) 0.07 (0.26) 0.19 (0.40) <0.01
Income Source - Farming 0.34 (0.47) 0.37 (0.48) 0.33 (0.47) 0.14
Income Source - Fishing 0.24 (0.43) 0.28 (0.45) 0.22 (0.41) 0.03
Income Source - Wage Labor 0.20 (0.40) 0.14 (0.35) 0.22 (0.42) <0.01
Poverty Score 42.17 (11.97) 37.25 (10.48) 44.51 (11.93) <0.01
Wealth Index - Polychoric PCA -0.11 (1.33) -0.70 (1.12) 0.17 (1.33) <0.01
Electricity in dwelling 0.63 (3.30) 0.42 (4.10) 0.74 (2.83) 0.18
Owns sala/sofa set 0.17 (0.38) 0.08 (0.28) 0.22 (0.41) <0.01
Owns refrigerator 0.10 (0.30) 0.03 (0.17) 0.13 (0.34) <0.01
Owns television 0.52 (0.50) 0.37 (0.48) 0.59 (0.49) <0.01
Owns VHS/DVD player 0.30 (0.46) 0.21 (0.41) 0.35 (0.48) <0.01
Owns radio 0.32 (0.47) 0.27 (0.45) 0.34 (0.47) 0.03
Owns satellite TV dish 0.31 (0.46) 0.18 (0.39) 0.37 (0.48) <0.01
Owns motor vehicle or boat 0.32 (0.47) 0.22 (0.41) 0.37 (0.48) <0.01
Owns gas stove 0.19 (0.39) 0.07 (0.26) 0.25 (0.43) <0.01
Owns cellphone 0.68 (0.47) 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) -
Number of cellphones 1.20 (1.19) 0.00 (0.00) 1.77 (1.04) <0.01
Owns SIM card 0.64 (0.48) 0.01 (0.07) 0.95 (0.23) 0.00
Number of SIM cards 1.33 (1.52) 0.01 (0.07) 1.95 (1.47) <0.01
Owns Globe SIM card 0.25 (0.43) 0.00 (0.00) 0.36 (0.48) <0.01
Owns SMART SIM card 0.55 (0.50) 0.01 (0.07) 0.81 (0.39) <0.01
In-degree centrality 5.40 (29.58) 5.64 (34.69) 5.29 (26.83) 0.87
Eigenvector centrality 0.09 (0.15) 0.11 (0.18) 0.09 (0.13) 0.01
Panel B: Adult Survey Module N=1617 N=516 N=1101 p-value
Do you see yourself as part of your community? 0.57 (0.49) 0.54 (0.50) 0.59 (0.49) 0.10
Do you feel isolated from the rest of your country? 0.30 (0.46) 0.31 (0.46) 0.30 (0.46) 0.88
Could you communicate with family in case of emergency? 0.46 (0.50) 0.38 (0.49) 0.50 (0.50) <0.01
Traveled to Neighboring Bgy. (12 mo.) 0.44 (0.50) 0.38 (0.48) 0.48 (0.50) <0.01
Traveled to Manila (3 yrs) 0.14 (0.35) 0.07 (0.25) 0.18 (0.38) <0.01
Total contacts within barangay 6.10 (6.34) 5.91 (4.46) 6.19 (7.05) 0.35
Total contacts outside barangay 4.02 (7.54) 3.33 (4.60) 4.34 (8.56) <0.01
Close friends/family within barangay 4.60 (1.69) 4.59 (1.58) 4.60 (1.75) 0.86
Close friends/family outside barangay 2.35 (1.67) 1.98 (1.49) 2.52 (1.72) <0.01
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Table 2.3: VBTS Konekt Tari Schedule
Network Interaction Type Tari (PHP)
Call from a Konekt number to another Konekt number 1.00/minute
Call from a Konekt number to a long-distance on-network number 3.00/minute
Call from a Konekt number to an long-distance o-network number 5.50/minute
Text from Konekt number to Konekt number 0.25/message
Text from Konekt number to long-distance on-network number 0.50/message
Text from Konekt number to long-distance o-network number 1.00/message
All incoming calls FREE
Incoming text messages (on-network local and long-distance) FREE
Incoming text messages (o-network) NOT ALLOWED
Table 2.4: Summary of Call Detail Record, By VBTS Site
VBTS Site All OutgoingCalls
Mean Outgoing
Call Time
Incoming
Calls
Mean Incoming
Call Time
Outgoing
SMS
Incoming
SMS
Site 1 2,073 287 39.44 1,024 144.93 309 453
Site 2 680,556 76,133 29.00 238,265 84.06 191,584 174,574
Site 3 110,782 19,516 33.69 50,555 129.71 26,843 13,868
Site 4 110,284 22,768 31.26 59,253 118.58 15,980 12,283
Site 5 2,711 895 33.07 1,310 78.48 207 299
Site 6 4,645 2,060 22.77 1,671 89.98 542 372
Site 7 41,825 7,876 35.36 20,320 98.18 8,427 5,202
Table 2.5: Call Usage Summary Statistics, by Baseline Phone Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All No Phone Owned Phone p-valueN=1131 N=364 N=767
Any Transaction (prop.) 0.65 (0.48) 0.66 (0.47) 0.64 (0.48) 0.47
Count of Calls & SMS 773.75 (1462.56) 671.33 (1349.35) 822.36 (1511.74) 0.09
Any Outgoing Call (prop.) 0.56 (0.50) 0.60 (0.49) 0.55 (0.50) 0.14
Count of Outgoing Calls 100.78 (203.43) 99.71 (187.46) 101.29 (210.71) 0.90
Count of Long-distance Outgoing Calls 70.82 (140.75) 71.30 (136.18) 70.59 (142.95) 0.94
Any Outgoing SMS (prop.) 0.53 (0.50) 0.56 (0.50) 0.52 (0.50) 0.29
Count of Outgoing SMS 201.99 (481.14) 165.87 (418.10) 219.13 (507.69) 0.06
Count of Long-distance Outgoing SMS 120.08 (274.63) 102.24 (263.40) 128.55 (279.57) 0.12
Any Incoming Call (prop.) 0.61 (0.49) 0.63 (0.48) 0.60 (0.49) 0.32
Count of Incoming Calls 299.37 (576.33) 263.65 (504.48) 316.32 (607.04) 0.13
Count of Long-distance Incoming Calls 268.70 (542.41) 234.23 (465.22) 285.05 (574.99) 0.11
Any Incoming SMS (prop.) 0.60 (0.49) 0.61 (0.49) 0.60 (0.49) 0.81
Count of Incoming SMS 171.61 (413.95) 142.11 (379.36) 185.62 (428.92) 0.08
Count of Long-distance Incoming SMS 89.79 (217.88) 75.60 (214.38) 96.52 (219.34) 0.13
Standard deviations in parentheses. P-value for t-test of equality of means for No Phone and Owned Phone groups in column 4. Summary
statistics by pre-existing phone ownership shown in Table A.2.2.
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Figure 2.3: Site Activity
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Figure 2.4: Network Usage by VBTS Site
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Table 2.6: Determinants of Mobile Network Usage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any
Transaction
Total
Transactions
Out Calls Out SMS In Calls In SMS
Owned Phone at Baseline 0.05 −19.70 −5.72 −3.32 −2.40 −8.26
(0.03) (40.05) (5.81) (13.32) (15.51) (11.45)
Wealth Index (SD) 0.03∗ 42.19∗∗ 5.96∗ 12.78∗ 11.77∗ 11.68∗∗
(0.01) (14.30) (2.74) (5.06) (5.71) (4.23)
Contacts Outside Barangay −0.00 −1.17 −0.18 −0.20 −0.59 −0.20
(0.00) (1.46) (0.20) (0.44) (0.57) (0.44)
In-degree Centrality (SD) 0.00 −4.96 −0.75 −2.47 0.58 −2.32
(0.01) (9.81) (1.33) (3.69) (2.09) (2.95)
Household Size 0.02∗∗ 2.07 −0.90 0.40 1.53 1.04
(0.01) (7.52) (1.08) (2.43) (3.02) (2.18)
HOH - Female 0.05∗ −3.03 4.35 −1.52 −4.16 −1.70
(0.02) (30.28) (5.13) (10.47) (12.08) (8.88)
HOH - Secondary −0.01 87.44∗ 7.25 28.18∗ 27.14 24.86∗
(0.03) (39.15) (5.53) (14.09) (15.01) (11.73)
Income - Farming 0.11∗∗∗ −10.40 −2.86 −3.12 1.33 −5.75
(0.03) (36.57) (5.88) (12.84) (14.05) (10.90)
Income - Fishing 0.10∗∗ −67.69 −3.89 −20.01 −22.86 −20.94
(0.03) (39.53) (6.59) (13.78) (15.71) (11.10)
Work Outside Barangay 0.00 −30.15 −1.96 −8.99 −13.91 −5.30
(0.02) (29.94) (4.79) (10.33) (11.55) (8.72)
Cog. Ability Score (SD) 0.02 6.52 1.82 1.57 1.61 1.52
(0.01) (13.00) (2.19) (4.21) (5.84) (3.37)
R2 0.39 0.27 0.16 0.21 0.22 0.23
Adj. R2 0.38 0.26 0.15 0.20 0.21 0.22
Num. obs. 1131 1131 1131 1131 1131 1131
RMSE 0.38 456.93 75.10 155.02 183.44 131.84
Mean of Outcome 0.65 773.75 100.78 201.99 299.37 171.61
S.D. of Outcome (0.48) (1462.65) (203.43) (481.14) (576.33) (413.95)
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables with (SD) are in
standardized units. Site xed eects included.
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Chapter Three
The Price is Right?
Statistical evaluation of a crowd-sourced market
information system in Liberia
Abstract
Many critical policy decisions depend upon reliable and up-to-date information on market prices.
Such data are used to construct consumer price indices, measure ination, detect food insecurity,
and inuence macroeconomic policy. In developing countries, where many of these problems are
most acute, reliable market price information can be hard to come by. Here, we evaluate data from
Premise, a new technology for measuring price information using crowd-sourced data contributed
by local citizens. Our evaluation focuses on Liberia, a country with a history of economic and
political instability. Using data from Premise, which recently began data collection in Liberia,
we analyze tens of thousands of individual price observations collected at hundreds of dierent
locations in Monrovia. We illustrate how these data can be used to construct composite market
price indices, and compare these constructed indices and prices for individual products to “ground
truth” data from the Central Bank of Liberia and the United Nations World Food Programme. Our
results indicate that the crowd-sourced price data correlates well with traditional price indices.
However, we nd statistically and economically signicant deviations from traditional measures
that require more in-depth investigation. We conclude by discussing how indices based on Premise
data can be further improved with simple supervised learning methods that use traditional low-
frequency data to calibrate and cross-validate the high-frequency Premise-based indices.†
†The material in this chapter is based on material originally published with Joshua Blumenstock in 2015, see
Blumenstock and Keleher (2015).
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3.1 Introduction and Motivation
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is one of the most important economic statistics used by policy-
makers to determine macroeconomic policy and to evaluate the health of an economy (Mankiw
2014). It is the primary barometer for measuring ination, which in turn impacts both scal and
monetary policy; it is used to calculate purchasing power and determine exchange rates; it also
directly impacts wages and welfare payments in both the private and public sector.
The CPI is intended to capture the overall cost of goods and services paid for by a typical
individual at local markets. It requires two primary inputs: the “basket of goods” that is intended
to be representative of a typical consumer; and the price for each of the goods in the basket. Prices
of goods in the common basket are the focus of this paper.
The lack of reliable and up-to-date price information is particularly problematic in fragile
economies, where dependence on subsistence agriculture and the lack of insurance and other
social safety nets can exacerbate the welfare impacts of weather shocks, political instability, and
food insecurity as mediated through price changes. In Liberia and neighboring countries, for
instance, food prices have been one of the primary instruments used in assessing the economic
impacts of the recent Ebola outbreak (Glennerster and Suri 2015; Himelein and Kastelic 2015;
World Food Programme 2015b).
Here, we investigate a new technology for collecting price information in developing countries,
which relies on “crowd-sourced” observations collected by local citizens with mobile phones. We
focus on Premise, a technology platform that allows for mobile-equipped citizens to capture and
upload price information to a central service. This technology, described in greater detail in Sec-
tion 3.3, is similar to a small number of related platforms that enable crowd-sourced data collection
in developing countries. The mClerk (Gupta et al. 2012) and txtEagle (Eagle 2009) platforms are
the most directly comparable systems of which we are aware; both use mobile-based platforms to
gather data from low-end mobile phones. More broadly, several examples of researchers sourcing
data from the crowd exist. For instance, Starbird and Palen (2011) study microblogging in response
to a large earthquake in Haiti in 2010, and Ashley et al. (2009) describe several other emerging
technological systems that facilitate participatory contribution in development areas including
agriculture, rural development and natural resource management. In the closest study to our own,
Hamadeh, Rissanen, and Yamanaka (2013) conduct a feasibility study to explore the use of the Jana
platform for collecting price data. While Hamadeh, Rissanen, and Yamanaka (2013) demonstrate
the potential of the platform, they focus on a description of the technological platform, rather than
on evaluating the accuracy of the collected data in comparison to external sources of validation
data.1
Dierent from prior work, our focus is not on the technological artifact or interface used to
collect data; rather, we study the data generated by this platform, and statistically evaluate its
potential for use as an index of ination and related economic activity. The empirical analysis
1A much more extensive literature, which we do not review here, explores the potential for data collection using
mobile phones in developed economies (Lane et al. 2010). A separate literature discusses how mobile data can be used
for population-based inferences of social and economic indicators (Blumenstock 2014; Eagle, Macy, and Claxton 2010;
Frias-Martinez et al. 2013).
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relies on data generated from the Premise network of contributors in Liberia, which has been
collecting price information on 38 market goods in Monrovia since late 2014. We present the
data set and document several prominent features related to the stability and noise present in
the raw data (Section 3.3), discuss corrections that improve the reliability of derivative metrics
(Section 3.3), and describe a basic method for computing a consumer price index from the crowd-
sourced data (Section 3.3). Section 3.4 compares these indices to alternative measures of ination
in Liberia.
This paper thus makes three primary contributions. First, we illustrate how crowd-sourced
market data can be used to construct price indices, and characterize the statistical properties of
these indices. Second, we carefully evaluate these indices by comparing them to traditional meth-
ods for measuring food insecurity. Finally, we discuss a simple supervised learning framework
that can be used to improve the accuracy of high-resolution estimates through calibration and
cross-validation with low-resolution sources of data.
Figure 3.1: Premise Data collection methodology. Premise indexes and analyzes data captured
by a global network of contributors. Bottom-left: Location of Liberia and its capital Monrovia.
Main gure: Locations from which contributors have captured data. Numbers indicate the num-
ber of data points collected from each location over the past three months; square icons are actual
images uploaded by contributors. Top-right: Schematic of data capture process in which a con-
tributor uses a cameraphone to photograph the prices of pasta at a local market. These photos
are sent to Premise and form the basis for the data we analyze.
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Figure 3.2: Raw data captured by Premise contributors. Data for 38 dierent products is
captured by Premise contributors (light grey lines). Of these goods, 6 are in the “Grains and
Flours” product group (dark blue lines), corresponding to bread, bulgur wheat, butter rice, cassava
our, fan-fan rice, and USA parboiled rice. Using the methods described in Section 3.3, these six
product price-series are aggregated into a single sub-index for the product group (red line). Each
series is normalized to a value of 100 on October 15, 2015.
3.2 Consumer Price Indices in Liberia
Following Liberia’s long-entrenched civil war and post-conict recovery, which ended in 2003,
the country took several years to achieve political and economic stability. Between 2011 and 2014,
consumer prices in Liberia followed a roughly linear trend with mean year-to-year ination of
approximately 9%. In the period following the Ebola Virus Disease epidemic, the country saw an
uptick in the price index, with year-to-year ination rising to a peak of 16.3% in September 2014.
With the rise in consumer prices, concern over access to food was heightened. As of writing,
the government and international agencies remained vigilant to the threat to food security that
increased prices posed for Liberian households (Himelein and Kastelic 2015).
Price data is historically accessible to a limited set of actors and on an infrequent basis. Ocial
price data is collected by the Liberian government and analyzed by the Central Bank of Liberia in
order to produce aggregate price indices on a monthly basis. Data collected by the United Nations
World Food Programme (WFP) is typically collected for the purpose of monitoring food insecurity.
However, data collected for food security monitoring covers a more limited set of consumption
items and locations relative to the government statistics.
Price data plays an integral roll in the WFP’s forecasts of food shortages, as food prices in-
uence household spending decisions. As such, the WFP uses food prices as an indicator of the
impact of economic shocks on households. Access to timely price data has been especially im-
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portant during the 2014–15 Ebola epidemic in West Africa, where the combination of restricted
economic activity, loss of life, and loss of sources of income have culminated in a threat to food
security (World Food Programme 2015a).
3.3 Premise Data
Technology platform
Premise (www.premise.com) is a technology company based in San Francisco that oers a plat-
form for capturing data from a distributed network of individual contributors.2 The intent of the
platform is to enable rapid and adaptive measurement of local economic and social infrastructure,
using data collected by local citizens. Premise recruits individuals in urban and rural regions of
developing countries to perform simple, structured tasks that capture information about their
local community (Figure 3.1). Premise currently operates in 32 countries worldwide. A major
focus of Premise’s eorts to date has been on collecting price data from developing countries.
Premise contributors use photo-enabled phones to capture prices in local markets. Contrib-
utors are compensated in the local currency, and are trained in person prior to submitting data.
Each day, contributors receive a list of tasks which detail the items for which price observations
are needed. Contributors are typically paid a piece rate for each successfully completed task,
for an amount “on the order of the price of an egg” for each data point captured.3 Photos and
price information submitted by the contributor go through a quality control screening process,
described in more detail below.
Beginning in September 2014, Premise initiated data collection in Liberia in an eort to produce
a Food Staples Price Index (FSPI) as well as other measures of economic and business activity.
Premise data collection in Liberia launched in response to the 2014 Ebola Virus Disease epidemic
in West Africa. The initial goal was to provide timely information about prices of key consumer
goods. The initial focus has been in Monrovia, where Premise collects daily price observations for
staple foods and non-food consumer items in all of Monrovia’s major market areas (Figure 3.1).
In the summer of 2015, Premise expanded data collection in rural markets of Liberia, beginning
with the towns of Voinjama and Fish Town.
Premise currently receives approximately 600 price observations per week for a basket of
38 unique products, from a small network of independent contributors in Liberia.4 As can be
observed in Appendix Table A1, which presents summary statistics for the raw contributor data,
there is a great deal of variation in the frequency at which each product is observed, the number of
unique locations at which a product is captured, and the price level and variance for each product
over time. As we describe in the following section, the number of errant observations also varies
considerably by product.
2Contributors are analogous to enumerators or surveyors in traditional terminology for primary data collection.
3Based on private correspondence with Premise sta, July 2015.
4Data volumes in Liberia are low compared to other countries. For example, Premise contributors submit up-
wards of 15,000 observations per week for 150 items in Nigeria.
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Detecting outliers in crowd-sourced data
The raw data captured by Premise contributors in Liberia are illustrated in Figure 3.2. Here, we
plot a separate time series for each of the 38 products as a semi-transparent grey line. Each of
these lines represents the daily average price for that product, averaged across all observations
taken on that day by all contributors in all locations. Highlighted in blue are the six time series
corresponding to products in the “Grains and ours” category. In red is the composite sub-index,
calculated using a procedure we will shortly describe.
As is evident in the product-level time series in Figure 3.2, the raw data collected by Premise
contributors is subject to several sources of error. On some occasions there appear to be idiosyn-
cratic spikes where a single product’s price will change by as much as 200%; at others, these
spikes appear to be correlated across products. Of primary concern is disentangling from actual
changes in prices from measurement error. As has been documented in related work, there are
many possible sources of such error, both accidental and deliberate (Birnbaum, Borriello, et al.
2013; Birnbaum, DeRenzi, et al. 2012; Hamadeh, Rissanen, and Yamanaka 2013). These include
input errors (for instance, a misplaced decimal point or a photograph of the oor), as well as out-
right fraud where a contributor intentionally falsies data. Premise implements several measures
to detect and prevent such deliberate fraud (Premise 2014), but many of these are not publicly
disclosed, and in practice aect a relatively small number of total captured data.
In follow-up work, we are developing more rened techniques for identifying and removing
erroneous data, which may constitute as much as 20% of the total data captured on the Premise
platform. Here, we describe a simple procedure that, based on manual verication, appears to
catch a large share of these errors. Formally, we denote by Pitlk an observation recorded by
individual i at time t in location l for item k. We dene price outliers as those observations that
deviate signicantly from historical prices for a given product, i.e.,
|log(Pitlk)− log(µtlk)| > λkσtlk (3.1)
where µtlk = 1Nn
∑
i
∑
s<t Pislk is the average historical value for k at location l (assuming
N individuals and n observations where s < t), and σtlk is the corresponding standard deviation.
When insucient observations exist from which to derive reliable estimates of µtlk and σtlk,
a “bootstrap” process is used to manually curate and reject anomalous observations. In this
framework, λk is the key parameter which determines the stringency with which outliers will be
identied.
Currently, Premise employs a common threshold across all products of λk = λ ≈ 3. In
ongoing work, we are exploring a supervised learning approach to determining a product-specic
λk, which will allow for some products with greater expected variation over time to exhibit more
intertemporal variability. We are also testing density-based techniques (Ester et al. 1996) and
other alternative methods for outlier detection.
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Computing CPI from crowd-sourced data
A primary objective of the Premise application is to convert the disaggregated price data collected
by the network of contributors into more meaningful price indices, similar to the CPI, which can
then be used to measure ination and inform food policy decision-making. Here, we describe the
process used to construct the Food Staples Price Index (FSPI), the Premise equivalent of the CPI,
from the disaggregated data. Formally, our goal is to compute an aggregate CPIrm for a region r
in month m, from a large number of disaggregated price observations Pitlk.
Given the set of Pitlk with outliers removed, the FSPI CPIrm is constructed using a process
based loosely on the methods employed by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics BLS (2008). Initially,
the average daily price PT lk for item k at location l is constructed by taking the average of all |T |
observations collected on day T ,
PT lk =
1
N |T |
∑
i∈l
∑
t∈T
Pitlk (3.2)
This value is still quite specic, as l can be as precise as a single storefront location, and k can
be unique to an item SKU, such as the price of one bottle of Club Beer (a local beer), or the cost
of a bucket of low-grade gari (a local our). These item-day averages are next aggregated into
product-day averages PT lK by standardizing units of measurement (e.g., pounds to grams) and
taking the geometric mean of related products (e.g., beef briskets), i.e.,
PT lK =
( K∏
k=1
PT lk
)1/k
(3.3)
Product-day averages are similarly aggregated across all locations in a region and across all
days in a time window to produce monthly estimates of the regional cost of a specic product.
These product averages are further aggregated into product sub-groups (e.g., standard cut beef),
product groups (e.g., beef), and sub-indices (e.g., meat). This aggregation uses weights that are
determined based on the estimated expenditures of consumers on the various items. In Liberia,
these weights are determined by a recent consumer expenditure survey (Group 2013).
In Liberia there are 12 such sub-indices, which indicate the prices of the most common items
in the country. The nal step in constructing the FSPI is to combine the sub-indices into a single
consumer price index that reects the price level of a typical market basket of food staples. The
weightswk for each of the sub-indices used in constructing the Liberian FSPI are given in Table 3.1.
Thus, the composite FSPI can be expressed as a weighted aggregate of the original contributor
observations:
CPIrm =
1
|r||m|
∑
l∈r
∑
T∈m
wkPT lK (3.4)
The FSPI for Liberia, computing using the above methodology, as well as the 12 sub-indices,
is shown in Figure 3.3. To emphasize the uctuations within a product category over time, each
index is normalized so that the value on October 15, 2014 is set to 100.
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Figure 3.3: Premise FSPI and sub-indices, as calculated from contributor data. Following
the procedure described in Section 3.3, sub-indices are computed for each of the 12 product groups
listed in Table 3.1. Using the weights listed in the same table, the composite Food Staples Price
Index, the Premise equivalent of a CPI, is calculated and shown as a thick red line.
3.4 Evaluation Results
The methods described above make it possible to construct a CPI-like metric, the FSPI, as well
as several sub-indices of product-group prices, from the data captured by Premise contributors
(Figure 3.3). In order to validate the relevance of these constructs, we take two approaches — one
at the aggregate index level and another at the item level. We draw from two sources of data
for the validation. The purpose of this comparison is to judge the consistency and reliability of
Premise data vis-a-vis an economic indicator for the Liberian economy as well as a best-available
option for policymakers interested in food security as proxied by the price of individual goods.
The data for the former comparison comes from the Central Bank of Liberia, while the item-level
comparison is conducted with a primary source of data collected for the United Nations World
Food Programme with the purpose of tracking threats to food security in Liberia.
Comparison data
Central Bank of Liberia
The Central Bank of Liberia releases headline consumer price index data from the 15th day of each
month. National price level are based on monthly price surveys conducted by the Liberia Institute
of Statistics and Geo-information Services (LISGIS). Price indices are provided for the overall price
level, food and non-alcoholic beverages (split by domestic and imported food), transportation, and
imported fuel. The inset of Figure 3.4 displays the time series of the Food and Non-Alcoholic
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Figure 3.4: Comparison of FSPI to Central Bank CPI. Main gure shows the CPI calculated
by the Central Bank of Liberia and the FSPI based on Premise data. Inset gure displays the Food
and Non-Alcoholic Beverages relative price from May 2011 to April 2015.
Beverages Index for Liberia between May 2011 and April 2015. To emphasize relative changes in
prices, the index is normalized so that the value of the index in October 2014 is equal 100. The
impact of the Ebola epidemic, which caused year-to-year price ination to peak at 16% in Septem-
ber 2014, is evident in the gure. Note that the Central Bank index is intended to be nationally
representative, but Premise data for this period is restricted to the capital city, Monrovia.5
World Food Programme
We additionally compare the product-level data captured by Premise contributors to data acquired
from United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), which conducts regular data collection for
key food prices in order to assess food security and identify price shocks that disproportionately
aect poor households. We utilize data collected for the WFP on a key set of consumption goods
in Liberia, which were initiated in part to monitor the impact of Ebola on price ination. For
the purpose of comparability with the Premise data, we restrict the WFP data to a subset of four
goods: imported rice, cassava, palm oil and charcoal.6 Figure 3.6 shows the time series of mean
weekly price of both rice and cassava, as independently observed in Premise and WFP data.
5In July 2015, Premise initiated data collection in two rural markets, but these data were not available at the time
this research conducted.
6The WFP data captured six products in total, including brown cowpeas and gari our; however, the Premise
data collection does not include these items.
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Index component Weight (%)
Alcoholic Beverages 1.2%
Fruit 9.2%
Grains and Flours 13.7%
Meat, Fish and Animal Products 16.8%
Milk and Milk Products 6.1%
Non Alcoholic Beverages 12.0%
Oils and Fats 3.0%
Pulses, Nuts and Seeds 2.9%
Spices and Condiments 8.0%
Starchy Roots and Tubers 11.4%
Sugar and Sugar Products 2.2%
Vegetables 13.4%
Table 3.1: Weights used in constructing the FSPI. The composite Food Staple Price Index
is constructed as the weighted sum of 12 primary sub-indices, where the above weights are
determined based on a recent household expenditure survey.
Statistical comparison
Comparison to baselines
We compare the Premise data to both the Central Bank food and non-alcoholic beverages index
and the WFP individual item prices for the period from September 2014 to April 2015. Eectively,
we seek to quantify the dierences in Figures 3.4 and 3.6. These results are presented in Table 3.2,
which indicates the average per-month error (RMSE) as well as the correlation between datasets
over time. Since the CPI data is collected at the monthly level while the Premise data exists in daily
averages, we compare the two series by making monthly comparison of the CPI to the average
Premise data over the preceding 30-day period (row 1), and also by linearly interpolating the CPI
data between monthly observations and comparing at the daily level (row 2).
As is evident in Table 3.2, we nd suggestive evidence of a correlation between the aggregate
indices. Importantly, these correlations do not account for potential delays and osets in the
dierent series. For instance, if the Premise FSPI is a leading indicator of the CPI, or vice versa,
such patterns would not be reected in the results in Table 3.2. However, correlation of individual
food item prices is weaker. Our analysis thus suggests two areas for further investigation. First,
through a longer time series of indices, we will be able to test for a more robust lagged structure to
the relationship between the Central Bank indicators and Premise indicators. Second, the variation
in food item prices within and across sources suggest that methods for screening outliers and
validating price data with multiple source may improve stability of ocial price data for individual
products.
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Figure 3.5: Geospatially disaggregated time series. Premise data include individual price data
for 38 consumer goods from 310 unique locations in Monrovia, Liberia. This gure shows nor-
malized prices for grain and our products in the three geographic locations, with a red line to
indicate the 10-day moving average across all observations from each sub-region. Sub-regions
are identied using k-means clustering with ve clusters specied using latitude and longitude
of the observations submitted by the Premise contributor.
Corr RMSE RMSE (% of mean)
A. Central Bank Food Price Index
FSPI (Monthly Average) 0.64 2.97 3.58%
FSPI (Daily vs. Central Bank linear interpolation) 0.73 2.39 2.88%
B. Food Items (WFP, relative prices)
Rice 0.54 8.94 9.77%
Cassava 0.03 16.27 18.71%
Charcoal 0.35 6.29 6.64%
Table 3.2: Model performance. Measures of model accuracy and error, comparing Premise data
to data collected by the Liberian Central Bank and the World Food Programme.
Modeling improvements
Our analysis thus far indicates a suggestive correlation between Premise data and the indices
collected by the Liberian Central Bank. Moving forward, we believe a promising area for research
lies in using dierent sources of “ground truth” data to better calibrate the model used to construct
the FSPI. To take a simple example, one might imagine using cross-validation to select the optimal
parameters for outlier detection (in our case, the λk described in Section 3.3). This is a complicated
task, however, as there are known issues with existing sources of price as CPI data, so it is
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important that any supervised learning approach not overt the ground truth data. However, by
calibrating with multiple sources of external data, collected through dierent processes and at
dierent spatial and temporal resolution, we believe it should be possible to build more robust
and accurate price indices.
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Figure 3.6: Comparison of Premise and WFP Item Prices. Average price data for two food
items in Liberia. The blue lines represent the average weekly price data collected for rice (left) and
cassava (right). The green lines indicate the corresponding price data for the same item, collected
by the World Food Program’s Building Markets initiative. The red line indicates the composite
sub-index from Premise data, constructed from all goods in the grains (left) and starchy roots
(right) product categories. Each series is normalized to a value of 100 on the week of October 15,
2015.
3.5 Discussion
While Premise data is correlated with the two traditional price measures we were able to obtain,
there are statistical discrepancies that are not easily resolved.7 While we largely treat the Central
Bank of Liberia’s CPI data as “ground truth” and assume that deviations observed in the Premise
FSPI are errors, it is also conceivable that the Premise data might at times be accurate where
Central Bank data is not. Indeed, the two sources of data, while comparable, have distinct ad-
vantages and disadvantages that we discuss briey before concluding. Similarly, the WFP data
7One obvious source of these dierence may be the dierences in sampling frames used in data collection, for
instance the fact that the Central Bank surveys the entire country’s prices while Premise is thus far focused in
Monrovia; as Premise expands to additional markets it will be possible to test this hypothesis.
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relies upon the accuracy of reports from on-the-ground surveyors that are no less prone to errors
than Premise contributors. In fact, real-time data quality controls can be put in place through
Premise’s technology that are often lacking or slow to implement through traditional price data
collection methods.
Advantages of traditional price data
A primary advantage of traditional sources of price information is that they are familiar to most
consumers of price data. Governments and international organizations have well-established
mechanisms for collecting and processing price data, and a standard set of best practices exist for
determining sample frames, deciding price frequencies, and integrating the resulting measures
into macroeconomic decision-making. Centralized administration of these eorts further ensures
that governments and international organizations play an integral role in the collection of critical
economic data. Private sector eorts may be more subject to a dierent optimization problem, i.e.
prot maximization.
There are also economies of scale in centralized data collection. Governments and international
organizations conduct data collection, such as censuses, expenditure surveys and rm surveys,
that are complimentary to price data. For example, expenditure surveys are integral to updating
consumption basket estimates that feed into consumer price indices.
Advantages of Premise CPI
Relative to traditional models of price data collection, the Premise platform oers several distinct
advantages. In particular, Premise data is highly granular, and can be sourced continuously in
time and space, increasing the ability to track prices in real-time, in sub-regions of the country. In
Figure 3.5, for instance, we show how the original data, collected from over 300 unique locations,
can be aggregated to form sub-regional price indicators. For the gure, we cluster all of these
locations geographically (using k-means on the market geo-coordinates), then aggregate all data
by cluster. The three time-series graphs on the right show the original price data in the grains
and our category, from each of these market clusters (the points on the graphs). The red line
indicates the 10-day moving average, similar to the sub-index described earlier. While generally
correlated, there is within-market volatility that is not clearly reected in the Monrovia aggregate.
Such patterns are not visible in most traditional sources of price data.
While our focus has been on price data collection, the crowd-sourcing framework can also be
used to capture a much wider array of data types. Near-term possibilities include street mapping,
collecting information on the availability of public utilities, and mapping nancial inclusion. The
Premise platform for recruiting and compensating contributors makes it possible to quickly scale
data collection eorts, and to target specic regions with less reliable data.
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3.6 Conclusions
We describe and evaluate data from Premise, a platform for collecting crowd-sourced price infor-
mation from networks of local contributors in developing countries. Our focus on the statistical
properties of the Premise data, and on comparing Premise-based indices to more traditional mea-
sure of price ination, reveals several promising areas for future work.
First, further quantitative work would benet greatly from a longer panel of price data. While
the Premise data contains tens of thousands of observations and is collected at extremely high
frequency, the authoritative central bank data is collected only monthly. With only 9 months of
overlapping data, it is dicult to make robust statistical comparisons.
Second, there is considerable scope for improvement in the techniques used to identify erro-
neous data, caused both by innocent error and intentional fraud. The outlier removal system we
describe and implement appears to be reasonably eective, but is rather coarse and relies heavily
on (possibly unjustied) intuition. Given a labeled training set, where the source of erroneous
data points is known, it would be possible to develop more sophisticated methods tailored to
specic products, locations, and contributors.
Finally, and perhaps most promising, we believe signicant progress can still be made in
developing methods for supervised learning that use authoritative data to improve the accuracy
of estimates based on high-frequency data from Premise and related sources. Here, we made the
simple point that ination forecasts appear to improve when historical CPI data is supplemented
with data from Premise. Analogous approaches could be used to increase the granularity of
ocial CPI estimates (beyond the country-month), or to construct monthly Premise estimates
that correspond more closely to ocial benchmarks. As before, the absence of a long panel of
training data makes these exercises dicult in the immediate term, but as data from Premise’s
global network continues to stream in, it will open many opportunities for research that can
impact how prices and ination are measured in developing economies.
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Table A.1.1: Baseline Summary Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
Household Size 2,253 4.441 2.639 1 4 25
Household Head is female 2,253 0.257 0.437 0 0 1
Years in community 2,236 10.075 10.828 0.000 6.000 72.000
Household includes community leader 2,253 0.144 0.351 0 0 1
Household rents dwelling 2,253 0.709 0.454 0 1 1
Rooms in dwelling 2,252 1.531 1.118 1.000 1.000 12.000
Religion is Christian 2,253 0.712 0.453 0 1 1
Household expenditures (LD) 2,251 914.019 886.646 0.000 640.251 12,453.330
Per capita expenditures (LD) 2,251 259.392 284.261 0.000 168.888 4,151.111
Predicted per capita expenditures (LD) 2,253 176.171 95.773 23.079 151.379 952.211
Proxy means score 2,253 53.851 14.567 10 55 100
Wealth index (PCA) 2,253 −0.596 1.173 −3.600 −0.638 2.925
Cantril ladder (1–5) 2,253 2.318 1.104 1 2 5
Meals per day 2,248 1.788 0.700 1.000 2.000 4.000
Shock in past 12 months 2,253 0.623 0.485 0 1 1
Wealth Shock in past 12 months 2,253 0.499 0.500 0 0 1
Health Shock in past 12 months 2,253 0.322 0.467 0 0 1
In-degree centrality 2,253 3.230 3.080 0 2 22
Betweenness centrality 2,253 316.627 428.388 0.000 170.971 5,332.499
Eigenvector centrality 2,253 0.146 0.183 0.000 0.079 1.000
Notes: Household summary statistics for all 13 community blocks.
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Table A.1.2: Baseline Summary Statistics, by Community
C L W
p-value
N=722 N=958 N=976
Household size 4.12 (2.33) 4.58 (2.96) 4.44 (2.47) <0.01
Household head is female 0.27 (0.44) 0.27 (0.44) 0.23 (0.42) 0.14
Years in community 9.18 (10.32) 9.26 (10.42) 11.54 (11.42) <0.01
Household includes community leader 0.13 (0.34) 0.14 (0.35) 0.15 (0.36) 0.55
Household rents dwelling 0.75 (0.43) 0.63 (0.48) 0.75 (0.43) <0.01
Number of rooms in dwelling 1.43 (0.92) 1.82 (1.43) 1.31 (0.77) <0.01
Religion is Christian 0.58 (0.49) 0.74 (0.44) 0.78 (0.41) <0.01
Household expenditures (LD) 689.45 (508.38) 658.44 (473.27) 1334.02 (1207.18) <0.01
Per capita expenditures (LD) 208.93 (174.73) 189.62 (167.98) 366.14 (390.15) <0.01
Predicted per capita expenditures (LD) 185.14 (92.71) 161.57 (90.20) 166.28 (85.70) <0.01
Proxy means score 56.04 (13.97) 53.13 (14.75) 52.97 (14.66) <0.01
Wealth index (PCA) -0.34 (1.09) -0.50 (1.21) -0.88 (1.14) <0.01
Cantril ladder (1–5) 2.32 (1.18) 2.39 (1.02) 2.25 (1.12) 0.04
Meals per day 1.77 (0.71) 1.69 (0.69) 1.90 (0.69) <0.01
Any shock in past 12 months 0.63 (0.48) 0.66 (0.47) 0.73 (0.44) <0.01
Wealth shock in past 12 months 0.45 (0.50) 0.49 (0.50) 0.55 (0.50) <0.01
Health shock in past 12 months 0.28 (0.45) 0.31 (0.46) 0.37 (0.48) <0.01
In-degree centrality 2.82 (2.94) 2.94 (3.26) 2.76 (2.90) 0.40
Betweenness centrality 266.24 (359.96) 337.50 (514.57) 211.50 (306.88) <0.01
Eigenvector centrality 0.13 (0.17) 0.13 (0.17) 0.12 (0.19) 0.74
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Table A.1.3: Baseline Summary Statistics (Clara Town)
C1 C2 C3
p-value
N=321 N=251 N=150
Household size 3.99 (2.19) 4.10 (2.43) 4.41 (2.41) 0.24
Household head is female 0.26 (0.44) 0.31 (0.46) 0.21 (0.41) 0.08
Years in community 8.19 (9.94) 10.64 (11.27) 8.59 (9.02) 0.03
Household includes community leader 0.16 (0.36) 0.11 (0.31) 0.11 (0.32) 0.25
Household rents dwelling 0.70 (0.46) 0.77 (0.42) 0.83 (0.37) 0.01
Number of rooms in dwelling 1.41 (0.87) 1.35 (0.87) 1.62 (1.08) 0.02
Religion is Christian 0.57 (0.50) 0.60 (0.49) 0.55 (0.50) 0.59
Household expenditures (LD) 645.61 (428.14) 727.93 (639.53) 709.82 (378.31) 0.19
Per capita expenditures (LD) 204.24 (193.06) 222.78 (174.62) 194.18 (130.35) 0.29
Predicted per capita expenditures (LD) 178.64 (98.06) 197.39 (94.70) 178.55 (74.22) 0.03
Proxy means score 57.26 (13.68) 54.36 (14.29) 56.56 (13.77) 0.07
Wealth index (PCA) -0.30 (1.08) -0.41 (1.06) -0.26 (1.14) 0.38
Cantril ladder (1–5) 2.26 (1.23) 2.33 (1.16) 2.41 (1.12) 0.48
Meals per day 1.69 (0.67) 1.86 (0.78) 1.77 (0.63) 0.03
Any shock in past 12 months 0.64 (0.48) 0.72 (0.45) 0.47 (0.50) <0.01
Wealth shock in past 12 months 0.42 (0.49) 0.55 (0.50) 0.31 (0.47) <0.01
Health shock in past 12 months 0.28 (0.45) 0.36 (0.48) 0.13 (0.34) <0.01
In-degree centrality 2.45 (2.75) 3.03 (3.23) 3.27 (2.72) 0.01
Betweenness centrality 291.99 (396.68) 316.66 (383.91) 126.75 (128.22) <0.01
Eigenvector centrality 0.07 (0.11) 0.13 (0.18) 0.24 (0.19) <0.01
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Table A.1.4: Baseline Summary Statistics (Logan Town)
L1 L2 L3 L4
p-value
N=190 N=133 N=227 N=408
Household size 3.48 (1.93) 4.75 (3.07) 4.44 (2.79) 5.07 (3.24) <0.01
Household head is female 0.20 (0.40) 0.32 (0.47) 0.30 (0.46) 0.27 (0.44) 0.08
Years in community 8.06 (9.63) 10.09 (12.16) 8.18 (10.70) 10.07 (10.00) 0.07
Household includes community leader 0.17 (0.38) 0.22 (0.41) 0.14 (0.35) 0.11 (0.32) 0.03
Household rents dwelling 0.61 (0.49) 0.60 (0.49) 0.61 (0.49) 0.66 (0.47) 0.47
Number of rooms in dwelling 1.41 (0.86) 2.35 (1.90) 1.81 (1.34) 1.85 (1.47) <0.01
Religion is Christian 0.86 (0.35) 0.88 (0.33) 0.85 (0.35) 0.59 (0.49) <0.01
Household expenditures (LD) 555.87 (361.98) 716.57 (660.44) 698.48 (465.16) 665.51 (448.57) 0.01
Per capita expenditures (LD) 207.78 (173.38) 196.42 (196.15) 207.79 (180.06) 170.68 (147.91) 0.03
Predicted per capita expenditures (LD) 160.84 (77.73) 155.13 (84.35) 174.20 (109.62) 156.98 (84.97) 0.10
Proxy means score 49.92 (14.13) 52.51 (16.68) 56.16 (16.26) 53.18 (13.29) <0.01
Wealth index (PCA) -0.94 (1.09) -0.52 (1.30) -0.22 (1.25) -0.45 (1.16) <0.01
Cantril ladder (1–5) 2.47 (1.14) 2.53 (0.92) 2.51 (1.01) 2.25 (0.98) 0.01
Meals per day 1.77 (0.68) 1.55 (0.67) 1.86 (0.72) 1.62 (0.66) <0.01
Any shock in past 12 months 0.65 (0.48) 0.75 (0.43) 0.66 (0.47) 0.64 (0.48) 0.14
Wealth shock in past 12 months 0.48 (0.50) 0.56 (0.50) 0.40 (0.49) 0.52 (0.50) 0.03
Health shock in past 12 months 0.24 (0.43) 0.35 (0.48) 0.34 (0.47) 0.31 (0.46) 0.14
In-degree centrality 3.22 (3.61) 2.47 (3.33) 2.75 (2.64) 3.08 (3.37) 0.13
Betweenness centrality 194.51 (306.56) 107.23 (194.30) 285.40 (381.56) 508.14 (654.44) <0.01
Eigenvector centrality 0.14 (0.20) 0.13 (0.18) 0.04 (0.12) 0.17 (0.16) <0.01
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Table A.1.5: Baseline Summary Statistics (West Point)
W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 p-valueN=149 N=73 N=159 N=102 N=190 N=303
Household size 4.54 (2.44) 4.88 (2.80) 4.58 (2.31) 4.53 (2.29) 4.34 (2.76) 4.26 (2.38) 0.49
Household head is female 0.21 (0.41) 0.22 (0.42) 0.23 (0.42) 0.31 (0.47) 0.30 (0.46) 0.17 (0.38) 0.02
Years in community 10.01 (9.14) 12.60 (10.59) 12.38 (13.26) 12.97 (14.11) 10.68 (10.25) 11.69 (11.20) 0.31
Household includes community leader 0.09 (0.29) 0.17 (0.38) 0.16 (0.37) 0.19 (0.40) 0.15 (0.36) 0.15 (0.35) 0.38
Household rents dwelling 0.72 (0.45) 0.75 (0.43) 0.72 (0.45) 0.70 (0.46) 0.87 (0.34) 0.74 (0.44) 0.01
Number of rooms in dwelling 1.46 (0.91) 1.46 (0.95) 1.23 (0.61) 1.34 (0.54) 1.19 (0.52) 1.31 (0.90) 0.02
Religion is Christian 0.90 (0.30) 0.95 (0.23) 0.83 (0.37) 0.78 (0.42) 0.78 (0.41) 0.65 (0.48) <0.01
Household expenditures (LD) 1567.22 (1476.87) 1150.76 (870.41) 1633.11 (1473.54) 1698.04 (1203.57) 1195.51 (927.92) 1044.30 (1010.51) <0.01
Per capita expenditures (LD) 433.28 (469.51) 276.46 (230.45) 382.84 (302.44) 443.26 (389.97) 383.36 (454.89) 302.93 (359.63) <0.01
Predicted per capita expenditures (LD) 162.64 (83.33) 156.85 (84.57) 172.87 (80.85) 168.27 (78.12) 169.82 (83.69) 163.99 (93.25) 0.75
Proxy means score 50.93 (13.98) 52.18 (16.04) 50.69 (14.18) 52.44 (15.13) 53.33 (14.14) 55.47 (14.87) 0.02
Wealth index (PCA) -0.98 (1.16) -0.70 (1.18) -0.93 (1.07) -0.93 (1.08) -0.92 (1.05) -0.80 (1.22) 0.50
Cantril ladder (1–5) 2.13 (0.96) 2.67 (1.39) 2.59 (1.34) 2.13 (0.89) 2.24 (1.44) 2.08 (0.73) <0.01
Meals per day 1.92 (0.72) 1.89 (0.70) 1.89 (0.68) 1.91 (0.67) 1.82 (0.69) 1.93 (0.70) 0.74
Any shock in past 12 months 0.74 (0.44) 0.73 (0.45) 0.73 (0.45) 0.81 (0.39) 0.69 (0.46) 0.72 (0.45) 0.38
Wealth shock in past 12 months 0.57 (0.50) 0.44 (0.50) 0.54 (0.50) 0.62 (0.49) 0.53 (0.50) 0.54 (0.50) 0.43
Health shock in past 12 months 0.32 (0.47) 0.40 (0.49) 0.40 (0.49) 0.39 (0.49) 0.29 (0.45) 0.41 (0.49) 0.13
In-degree centrality 2.36 (2.66) 2.22 (2.53) 2.75 (3.02) 2.86 (2.65) 2.91 (2.88) 2.96 (3.10) 0.18
Betweenness centrality 173.24 (233.93) 54.03 (78.83) 181.81 (266.85) 93.91 (126.19) 211.08 (253.58) 323.69 (410.42) <0.01
Eigenvector centrality 0.16 (0.19) 0.12 (0.24) 0.09 (0.18) 0.17 (0.21) 0.05 (0.13) 0.15 (0.19) <0.01
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Table A.1.6: Baseline Summary Statistics, by TA Nomination Prompt
Nomination Prompt
1 2 3 F-Test
N=811 N=698 N=744 p-value
Household Size 4.48 (2.77) 4.46 (2.55) 4.39 (2.58) 0.80
Household head is female 0.27 (0.44) 0.25 (0.44) 0.25 (0.43) 0.58
Years in Community 10.66 (11.27) 9.47 (10.03) 10.01 (11.04) 0.11
Household includes a community leader 0.17 (0.38) 0.11 (0.32) 0.14 (0.35) 0.01
Household rents dwelling 0.71 (0.46) 0.70 (0.46) 0.72 (0.45) 0.62
Number of rooms in dwelling 1.62 (1.27) 1.49 (0.97) 1.47 (1.06) 0.02
Christian 0.74 (0.44) 0.68 (0.47) 0.72 (0.45) 0.07
Household expenditure (LD) 900.60 (913.50) 941.70 (942.26) 902.65 (799.19) 0.61
Per capita expenditure (LD) 255.92 (313.57) 257.06 (247.74) 265.38 (283.01) 0.78
Predicted PCE (LD) 173.87 (100.69) 175.34 (88.11) 179.46 (97.20) 0.50
Proxy means score 53.54 (14.56) 53.97 (14.60) 54.08 (14.56) 0.74
Cantril Ladder 2.29 (1.07) 2.36 (1.13) 2.31 (1.11) 0.44
Meals per day 1.77 (0.71) 1.79 (0.69) 1.81 (0.70) 0.65
In-degree Centrality 3.20 (2.99) 3.17 (3.00) 3.32 (3.25) 0.61
Betweenness Centrality 318.46 (423.27) 312.03 (394.05) 318.94 (463.92) 0.94
Eigenvector Centrality 0.15 (0.19) 0.14 (0.18) 0.15 (0.19) 0.58
Notes: One of three nomination prompts was randomly assigned to each baseline respondent.
Nomination Prompt 1: If we want to spread information about a social assistance program, to whom do you suggest we speak?;
Nomination Prompt 2: If we want to identify which people would be best to help us identify which people in this block would benet most from
a social assistance program, to whom do you suggest we speak?;
Nomination Prompt 3: If we want to identify which people would be best to help us identify which people in this block would benet most from
a cash gift for social assistance, to whom do you suggest we speak?
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Figure A.1.2: Per capita expenditure, simple module vs. full module
Table A.1.7: Knowledge of Neighbors, by TA Type
All TAs Random TAs Nominated TAs Leader TAs
N=393 N=132 N=254 N=94
# of neighbors 30.9 (6.05) 31.4 (5.46) 30.9 (6.19) 32.0 (6.11)
Prop. known 0.34 (0.22) 0.32 (0.22) 0.36 (0.22) 0.41 (0.24)
Prop. classied as poor 0.30 (0.28) 0.32 (0.30) 0.30 (0.27) 0.29 (0.26)
Accuracy 0.62 (0.22) 0.60 (0.23) 0.63 (0.22) 0.61 (0.21)
Inclusion Error Rate 0.10 (0.12) 0.09 (0.11) 0.10 (0.13) 0.12 (0.15)
Exclusion Error Rate 0.89 (0.16) 0.89 (0.15) 0.88 (0.17) 0.88 (0.16)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. TA types are not mutually exclusive.
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Figure A.1.3: Per capita expenditure (simple module) vs. PMT Score
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Figure A.1.4: Order of Random Neighbor and TA knowledge
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Table A.1.8: Targeting Assistant Knows Random Neighbor
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social Distance = 2 −0.236∗∗∗ −0.249∗∗∗ −0.236∗∗∗ −0.249∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.046) (0.024) (0.046)
Social Distance = 3 −0.383∗∗∗ −0.371∗∗∗ −0.373∗∗∗ −0.368∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.041) (0.022) (0.041)
Social Distance = 4 −0.446∗∗∗ −0.400∗∗∗ −0.428∗∗∗ −0.388∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.041) (0.021) (0.041)
Social Distance = 5 −0.491∗∗∗ −0.423∗∗∗ −0.462∗∗∗ −0.400∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.043) (0.023) (0.043)
Social Distance = 6 −0.486∗∗∗ −0.424∗∗∗ −0.454∗∗∗ −0.385∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.051) (0.030) (0.053)
Social Distance = 7 −0.541∗∗∗ −0.417∗∗∗ −0.490∗∗∗ −0.390∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.078) (0.051) (0.085)
Social Distance = 8 −0.448∗∗∗ −0.441∗∗ −0.463∗∗∗ −0.475∗∗
(0.112) (0.162) (0.113) (0.163)
Social Distance =∞ −0.520∗∗∗ −0.515∗∗∗ −0.545∗∗∗ −0.530∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.044) (0.028) (0.045)
Nominated TA 0.073 0.066
(0.045) (0.045)
Nominated TA * Social Distance = 2 0.021 0.023
(0.053) (0.053)
Nominated TA * Social Distance = 3 −0.014 −0.001
(0.048) (0.048)
Nominated TA * Social Distance = 4 −0.064 −0.053
(0.048) (0.047)
Nominated TA * Social Distance = 5 −0.099∗ −0.087
(0.050) (0.050)
Nominated TA * Social Distance = 6 −0.090 −0.100
(0.062) (0.063)
Nominated TA * Social Distance = 7 −0.209∗ −0.157
(0.095) (0.105)
Nominated TA * Social Distance = 8 0.011 0.040
(0.224) (0.224)
Nominated TA * Social Distance =∞ 0.014 0.018
(0.054) (0.059)
Adj. R2 0.057 0.060 0.071 0.073
Num. obs. 12130 12130 11140 11140
Neighbor Covariates NO NO YES YES
Neighbor Order F.E. YES YES YES YES
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Dependent variable is a binary variable equal to one if the respondent responds in the
armative to the question, “Have you heard of [NAME] in your community?”, where [NAME] is the name of a randomly selected adult from
the TA’s neighborhood. SD indicates that a variables has been mean-centered and scaled to represent one standard standard deviation.
Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses. Neighbor-Order xed eects included. Social Distance is the shortest path between
the nominating and nominated household as calculated using social network data from the baseline.
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Table A.1.9: Cash Grant Nominations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any
Nomination
Count of
Nominations
‘Best Use’
Nomination
‘Hard Times’
Nomination
Female HOH 0.041∗ 0.105∗∗ 0.015 0.055∗∗
(0.020) (0.036) (0.017) (0.017)
Years in community (SD) 0.041∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.017) (0.008) (0.008)
Leader 0.044 0.040 0.025 0.020
(0.026) (0.041) (0.022) (0.021)
Christian 0.070∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.034∗
(0.018) (0.029) (0.015) (0.015)
PCE Rank −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗ −0.000∗ −0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wealth Shock −0.020 −0.037 −0.032∗ −0.001
(0.017) (0.028) (0.014) (0.014)
Health Shock 0.017 0.075∗ 0.022 0.024
(0.019) (0.033) (0.016) (0.015)
Eigenvector Centrality (SD) 0.064∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.017) (0.009) (0.008)
R2 0.068 0.071 0.054 0.045
Adj. R2 0.060 0.063 0.046 0.036
Num. obs. 2236 2236 2236 2236
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. SD indicates that a variables has been mean-centered and scaled to represent one standard
standard deviation. Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses. Neighbor xed eects included.
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Table A.1.10: Cash Grant Nominations, First TA Nomination Only
(A)
Nominee Characteristics
(B)
Nominee Shocks
(C)
Dyadic Distance
Pred. PCE
Rank Female
Years in
Community Leader Christian
Eigenvector
Centrality
Wealth
Shock
Health
Shock
Social
Distance
Geographic
Distance
TA Type and Prompt:
Nominated TA −57.01 −0.10 1.47 −0.05 −0.05 −0.02 0.05 0.07 0.10 8.22
(133.37) (0.08) (2.15) (0.07) (0.06) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.18) (7.65)
Hard Times Elicitation −118.37 −0.00 0.00 −0.03 −0.08 −0.01 0.14 0.07 0.26 8.64
(137.89) (0.09) (2.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.03) (0.09) (0.09) (0.20) (11.12)
Nominated TA * Hard Times 110.33 0.07 −2.56 0.01 0.03 0.00 −0.01 −0.06 −0.15 −8.02
(177.24) (0.10) (2.70) (0.09) (0.08) (0.04) (0.11) (0.11) (0.25) (13.08)
Nominating TA Characteristics:
Predicted PCE Rank 0.12∗ 0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female −69.10 0.10 2.44 −0.03 0.03 −0.02 −0.04 0.11∗ 0.21 6.16
(94.41) (0.05) (1.42) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.13) (6.42)
Years in comm. (SD) −15.20 −0.01 1.18 −0.01 0.06∗∗ 0.00 0.02 0.02 −0.06 −2.79
(47.71) (0.03) (0.94) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (2.88)
Leader −8.44 0.07 −0.82 0.10 0.03 −0.01 −0.07 0.01 0.05 −3.82
(102.18) (0.06) (1.65) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.15) (6.09)
Christian −39.28 −0.07 0.80 0.05 0.39∗∗∗ 0.00 0.07 −0.04 −0.13 −13.17
(116.56) (0.06) (1.78) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.16) (8.75)
Eigenvector (SD) 14.49 −0.00 −1.06 0.02 0.01 0.11∗∗∗ 0.02 0.01 −0.11 −4.30
(48.96) (0.03) (0.72) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (2.37)
Adj. R2 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.26 0.26 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.11
Num. obs. 332 332 314 332 322 332 322 322 323 332
ρ+ θ = 0 (p-value) 0.94 0.23 0.14 0.80 0.27 0.79 0.08 0.97 0.50 0.93
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses. Neighborhood xed eects included.
Nominated TA is a binary variable equal to one if the Targeting Assistant was nominated by another community member. Targeting assistants were asked to provide two nominations for a
cash grant. We elicited the cash grant nominations through two independent questions. ‘Best Use’ elicitation question (reference group in table): “Think of households within this
neighborhood, which household would make the most out of a USD$100 cash grant?” ‘Hard Times’ elicitation question: “Within this neighborhood, is there a household who recently fell
on hard times and would benet most from a USD$100 cash grant?” Table 1.13 shows regression results including all cash grant nominees elicited from targeting assistants. Predicted PCE
Rank is the household ranking of the per capita expenditures as predicted by our random forest algorithm, centered at zero. Social Distance is the shortest path between the nominating and
nominated household as calculated using social network data from the baseline. Geographic distance is the number of meters between the nominating and nominated household’s dwelling
as measured by the spherical geodesic distance between the latitude-longitude coordinates of the dwellings.
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Table A.2.1: Baseline Summary Statistics, by VBTS Site
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
site 1 site 2 site 3 site 4 site 5 site 6 site 7
Panel A: Household Summary Statistics N=88 N=382 N=176 N=100 N=255 N=50 N=80 p-value
Adults in household 2.44 (1.18) 2.89 (1.36) 2.81 (1.31) 2.51 (1.15) 2.53 (1.24) 2.56 (1.15) 2.74 (1.38) <0.01
Children (0-14) in household 1.66 (1.29) 2.06 (1.62) 1.77 (1.51) 1.59 (1.40) 1.45 (1.28) 1.70 (1.52) 1.74 (1.56) <0.01
Female head of household 0.43 (0.50) 0.45 (0.50) 0.32 (0.47) 0.33 (0.47) 0.35 (0.48) 0.13 (0.34) 0.12 (0.32) <0.01
HOH - Secondary school 0.24 (0.43) 0.33 (0.47) 0.12 (0.32) 0.21 (0.41) 0.36 (0.48) 0.17 (0.38) 0.18 (0.39) <0.01
Rooms in dwelling 1.75 (0.75) 1.96 (0.87) 1.72 (0.78) 1.54 (0.77) 1.72 (0.76) 1.62 (0.67) 1.77 (0.78) <0.01
Household owns land 0.39 (0.49) 0.50 (0.50) 0.62 (0.49) 0.28 (0.45) 0.38 (0.49) 0.50 (0.51) 0.29 (0.46) <0.01
Family member in political/govt oce 0.05 (0.21) 0.25 (0.44) 0.32 (0.47) 0.32 (0.47) 0.11 (0.31) 0.16 (0.37) 0.12 (0.33) <0.01
Household has bank account 0.05 (0.21) 0.23 (0.42) 0.14 (0.35) 0.07 (0.26) 0.15 (0.35) 0.06 (0.24) 0.15 (0.36) <0.01
Income Source - Farming 0.14 (0.35) 0.40 (0.49) 0.48 (0.50) 0.40 (0.49) 0.29 (0.45) 0.46 (0.50) 0.04 (0.19) <0.01
Income Source - Fishing 0.42 (0.50) 0.21 (0.41) 0.35 (0.48) 0.30 (0.46) 0.04 (0.19) 0.02 (0.14) 0.62 (0.49) <0.01
Income Source - Wage Labor 0.16 (0.37) 0.22 (0.41) 0.09 (0.29) 0.13 (0.34) 0.31 (0.46) 0.26 (0.44) 0.06 (0.24) <0.01
Poverty Score 42.0 (9.7) 41.6 (12.6) 38.2 (12.1) 42.3 (10.6) 46.8 (11.6) 38.2 (8.1) 41.2 (11.5) <0.01
Wealth Index - Polychoric PCA -0.37 (1.21) 0.19 (1.32) -0.67 (1.36) -0.25 (1.25) 0.20 (1.28) -0.93 (1.05) -0.32 (1.14) <0.01
Electricity in dwelling 0.89 (0.32) 0.92 (0.28) 0.08 (5.86) 0.82 (0.39) 0.64 (4.89) 0.10 (0.30) 0.31 (0.47) 0.10
Owns sala/sofa set 0.12 (0.33) 0.22 (0.41) 0.12 (0.33) 0.11 (0.31) 0.23 (0.42) 0.08 (0.27) 0.10 (0.30) <0.01
Owns refrigerator 0.05 (0.21) 0.13 (0.33) 0.05 (0.22) 0.11 (0.31) 0.15 (0.36) 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.11) <0.01
Owns television 0.49 (0.50) 0.60 (0.49) 0.40 (0.49) 0.47 (0.50) 0.59 (0.49) 0.22 (0.42) 0.51 (0.50) <0.01
Owns VHS/DVD player 0.32 (0.47) 0.37 (0.48) 0.27 (0.44) 0.30 (0.46) 0.30 (0.46) 0.10 (0.30) 0.19 (0.39) <0.01
Owns radio 0.23 (0.42) 0.36 (0.48) 0.30 (0.46) 0.29 (0.46) 0.20 (0.40) 0.56 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) <0.01
Owns satellite TV dish 0.22 (0.41) 0.37 (0.48) 0.13 (0.34) 0.27 (0.45) 0.43 (0.50) 0.12 (0.33) 0.31 (0.47) <0.01
Owns motor vehicle or boat 0.39 (0.49) 0.23 (0.42) 0.31 (0.46) 0.32 (0.47) 0.35 (0.48) 0.56 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) <0.01
Owns gas stove 0.15 (0.36) 0.20 (0.40) 0.08 (0.27) 0.12 (0.33) 0.28 (0.45) 0.12 (0.33) 0.29 (0.46) <0.01
Owns cellphone 0.80 (0.41) 0.69 (0.46) 0.47 (0.50) 0.57 (0.50) 0.85 (0.36) 0.58 (0.50) 0.62 (0.49) <0.01
Number of cellphones 1.20 (0.91) 1.23 (1.22) 0.75 (1.07) 1.13 (1.38) 1.55 (1.11) 0.94 (1.17) 1.21 (1.24) <0.01
Owns SIM card 0.78 (0.41) 0.65 (0.48) 0.43 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 0.82 (0.38) 0.56 (0.50) 0.56 (0.50) <0.01
Number of SIM cards 1.34 (1.14) 1.34 (1.51) 0.84 (1.53) 1.21 (1.90) 1.73 (1.30) 1.04 (1.32) 1.38 (1.73) <0.01
Owns Globe SIM card 0.33 (0.47) 0.15 (0.36) 0.15 (0.36) 0.14 (0.35) 0.33 (0.47) 0.54 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50) <0.01
Owns SMART SIM card 0.70 (0.46) 0.61 (0.49) 0.39 (0.49) 0.48 (0.50) 0.73 (0.44) 0.12 (0.33) 0.26 (0.44) <0.01
In-degree centrality 4.38 (3.56) 6.13 (37.83) 5.15 (4.53) 2.85 (2.89) 6.88 (41.32) 3.18 (3.30) 3.52 (4.06) 0.89
Eigenvector centrality 0.07 (0.16) 0.04 (0.06) 0.17 (0.20) 0.14 (0.21) 0.06 (0.07) 0.21 (0.22) 0.20 (0.18) <0.01
Panel B: Adult Survey Module N=118 N=584 N=264 N=134 N=333 N=64 N=120 p-value
Do you see yourself as part of your community? 0.31 (0.47) 0.60 (0.49) 0.48 (0.50) 0.61 (0.49) 0.60 (0.49) 0.68 (0.47) 0.74 (0.44) <0.01
Do you feel isolated from the rest of your country? 0.19 (0.39) 0.28 (0.45) 0.18 (0.39) 0.22 (0.41) 0.45 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50) 0.35 (0.48) <0.01
Could you communicate with family in case of emergency? 0.53 (0.50) 0.41 (0.49) 0.23 (0.42) 0.31 (0.46) 0.73 (0.45) 0.40 (0.49) 0.65 (0.48) <0.01
Traveled to Neighboring Bgy. (12 mo.) 0.34 (0.48) 0.39 (0.49) 0.38 (0.49) 0.60 (0.49) 0.45 (0.50) 0.66 (0.48) 0.65 (0.48) <0.01
Traveled to Manila (3 yrs) 0.30 (0.46) 0.12 (0.32) 0.07 (0.26) 0.18 (0.39) 0.16 (0.37) 0.11 (0.31) 0.19 (0.40) <0.01
Total contacts within barangay 4.95 (2.20) 6.34 (6.47) 5.34 (2.44) 5.44 (3.17) 5.28 (2.86) 6.73 (6.08) 10.41 (15.7) <0.01
Total contacts outside barangay 2.86 (2.09) 4.96 (10.92) 2.65 (2.85) 3.99 (5.93) 2.77 (3.45) 4.62 (4.90) 6.76 (7.67) <0.01
Close friends/family within barangay 5.01 (2.17) 4.37 (1.22) 5.12 (1.92) 4.51 (1.70) 4.83 (2.01) 3.78 (1.00) 4.03 (1.38) <0.01
Close friends/family outside barangay 2.55 (1.93) 2.33 (1.59) 2.22 (1.67) 2.46 (1.64) 2.30 (1.93) 2.11 (1.20) 2.64 (1.19) 0.17
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Table A.2.2: Call Usage Summary Statistics, by VBTS Site
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
All sites site 1 site 2 site 3 site 4 site 5 site 6 site 7 p-valueN=1131 N=88 N=382 N=176 N=100 N=255 N=50 N=80
Any Transaction (prop.) 0.65 0.56 0.94 0.73 0.65 0.17 0.70 0.70 <0.01
(0.48) (0.50) (0.24) (0.45) (0.48) (0.38) (0.46) (0.46)
Calls & SMS 773.75 22.47 1793.83 479.85 619.42 3.47 80.26 457.51 <0.01
(1462.56) (64.74) (2001.78) (760.68) (1023.76) (21.72) (99.42) (678.30)
Any Outgoing Call (prop.) 0.56 0.20 0.90 0.66 0.63 0.05 0.64 0.66 <0.01
(0.50) (0.41) (0.30) (0.48) (0.49) (0.22) (0.48) (0.48)
Outgoing Calls 100.78 3.03 206.99 79.81 118.55 0.51 32.78 87.22 <0.01
(203.43) (11.72) (284.68) (114.87) (198.18) (3.59) (55.88) (135.66)
Long-distance Outgoing Calls 70.82 3.02 137.80 65.47 77.38 0.45 29.70 79.17 <0.01
(140.75) (11.71) (193.90) (93.89) (131.40) (3.04) (51.09) (122.49)
Any Outgoing SMS (prop.) 0.53 0.15 0.90 0.64 0.59 0.02 0.48 0.62 <0.01
(0.50) (0.36) (0.31) (0.48) (0.49) (0.14) (0.50) (0.49)
Outgoing SMS 201.99 3.19 499.99 115.93 87.39 0.22 8.40 94.42 <0.01
(481.14) (13.36) (709.54) (251.60) (165.78) (2.36) (16.54) (186.49)
Long-distance Outgoing SMS 120.08 3.18 277.37 94.37 53.22 0.11 8.08 90.16 <0.01
(274.63) (13.37) (391.76) (209.86) (97.45) (1.28) (16.42) (177.56)
Any Incoming Call (prop.) 0.61 0.35 0.92 0.69 0.65 0.12 0.62 0.66 <0.01
(0.49) (0.48) (0.27) (0.46) (0.48) (0.33) (0.49) (0.48)
Incoming Calls 299.37 11.33 640.99 223.09 339.56 2.15 31.80 217.19 <0.01
(576.33) (41.44) (754.34) (370.70) (687.46) (17.82) (49.22) (311.09)
Long-distance Incoming Calls 268.70 10.70 570.43 205.30 303.27 1.97 27.00 209.22 <0.01
(542.41) (41.49) (717.91) (357.45) (660.49) (17.75) (48.00) (305.75)
Any Incoming SMS (prop.) 0.60 0.51 0.93 0.68 0.64 0.10 0.52 0.60 <0.01
(0.49) (0.50) (0.25) (0.47) (0.48) (0.30) (0.50) (0.49)
Incoming SMS 171.61 4.91 445.87 61.02 73.92 0.60 7.28 58.67 <0.01
(413.95) (10.98) (612.04) (128.98) (170.58) (3.52) (17.07) (111.36)
Long-distance Incoming SMS 89.79 4.62 225.70 37.10 37.07 0.31 5.06 54.44 <0.01
(217.88) (10.85) (323.68) (84.95) (77.05) (1.91) (12.25) (106.39)
Standard deviations in parentheses. P-value for t-test of equality of means across all sites shown in column 9. Summary statistics by pre-existing
phone ownership shown in Table 2.5.
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Poverty Probability Index Score Card for the Philippines
Source: https://www.povertyindex.org/country/philippines
1. How many members does the household have?
2. Are all household members ages 6 to 17 currently attending school?
3. How many household members did any work for at least one hour in the past week
4. In their primary occupation or business in the past week, how many household members
were farmers, forestry workers shers, laborers, or unskilled workers?
5. What is the highest grade completed by the female head/spouse?
6. What type of construction materials are the outer walls made of?
7. Does the family own any sala sets?
8. Does the family own a refrigerator/freezer or a washing machine?
9. Does the family own a television set or a VTR/VHS/VCD/DVD player?
10. How many telephones/cellphones does the family own?
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Script for Registration
Hello! We’re going to give you your new SIM and we’ll help you activate it as well. First, as part
of the NTC regulatory requirements, we are informing you that this is a test and an experimental
network and the grade of service may NOT be the same as those of conventional networks. Here’s
a copy of the waiver/subscriber conforme, kindly ax your name and signature below.
(Customer signs. There should be two copies. Give one copy to the customer)
Here is your new SIM card! Please insert it into your phone.
(Sta would then assist the customer to follow the step-by-step instructions stated in this SIM provi-
sioning guide)
You have now activated your SIM! As stated in the text message, your number is 09XXXXXXX.
(Sta will input the number on the form)
Finally, to celebrate the launch of the new network, we will be oering several dierent promos
in the coming months. Subscribers will be selected through a lottery system for the opportunity
to avail of one specic promo each. Please refer to this yer for more information on the promo
opportunities. Some of subscribers will receive promos for a certain number of free text messages,
some will receive promos to use for a select group of friends and family members, some will
receive promos to contact people living outside the network. In the coming months, look for a
text message on your phone notifying you of your promo.
Thank you. Please proceed to the next table for the nal step.
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Customer Agreement
Rules and Guidelines on using the KONEKT Barangay Promo SIM (English Translation)
1. To be able to use the services oered by the Konekt Barangay Promo SIM, you must have
the following:
(a) A working GSM 900 or multiband cellphone
(b) A working Konekt Barangay Promo SIM
(c) Konekt Barangay Promo SIM prepaid load credit
2. The Konekt Barangay Promo SIM is a promo of GK Mabuhay and may not provide the same
quality of service as the conventional Globe or TM Prepaid SIM. The Konekt Barangay
Promo SIM will only work within a 300–500m radius from the location of the Konekt
Barangay base station site. The Konekt Barangay Promo SIM allows you to:
(a) Call to other mobile and landline numbers within the Philippines
(b) Receive calls from other mobile numbers within the Philippines
(c) Send texts (SMS) from any Globe or TM mobile number within the Philippines. Texts
from other operators (non-Globe/TM) will not be received.
(d) The Konekt Barangay Promo SIM will not work if you are outside the 500m radius
from the base station
(e) You cannot make or receive calls from outside the Philippines
(f) You cannot avail any Globe/TM value added services and promotions such as ring-back
tones, etc.
3. The Konekt Barangay Promo SIM is a promo that may start anytime from [START DATE]
until [END DATE]. Globe reserves the right to terminate the promo and selling of the
Konekt Barangay Promo SIM and load at any time and date after the promo period. Because
this is a promo service, Globe may terminate the service at any time and Globe is not obliged
to nish the promo period.
4. The Konekt Barangay Promo SIM can be bought at its suggested retail price (SRP) of Php
15.00 from your local retailer.
5. The use of the services of the Konekt Barangay Promo SIM has a corresponding cost. Globe
may change the service rates, with the approval of the National Telecommunications Com-
mission (NTC), without any notications to its subscribers.
6. The Konekt Barangay Promo SIM has its own retails and load sellers. Prepaid load for
the Konekt Barangay Promo SIM is not available from the Globe/TM loading outlets. You
cannot also buy prepaid load using Globe Autoload Max.
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Network Interaction Type Tari (PHP)
Call from a Konekt number to another Konekt number 1.00/minute
Call from a Konekt number to a long-distance on-network number 3.00/minute
Call from a Konekt number to an long-distance o-network number 5.50/minute
Text from Konekt number to Konekt number 0.25/message
Text from Konekt number to long-distance on-network number 0.50/message
Text from Konekt number to long-distance o-network number 1.00/message
All incoming calls FREE
Incoming text messages (on-network local and long-distance) FREE
Incoming text messages (o-network) NOT ALLOWED
7. It is the responsibility of the SIM and phone owner to protect his/her own mobile phone,
SIM and its corresponding PIN/PUK from load theft and unauthorized load usage. All calls,
SMS and other transactions will be charged accordingly.
8. You shall not use the Konekt Barangay SIM or Load for any unlawful, fraudulent, elicit
or abusive purpose. The Konekt distributor or partner may terminate the service of any
subscriber who shall exhibit abusive usage.
9. The Konekt Barangay load of any subscriber who deliberately violates the terms and condi-
tions stated in this document will be voided. The Konekt partner will not return any value
or load to the oending subscriber.
10. Globe Telecom reserves the right to amend these terms and conditions at any time, with or
without prior notice.
11. The Konekt Barangay Promo SIM is owned by Globe and uses new technology to provide
cellular access to previously unserved sites.
12. By using the Konekt Barangay Promo SIM, the following information will be stored in a
cloud server owned by a third-party:
(a) Konekt barangay number and all called or texted numbers
(b) Details of all calls, SMS, and data made/used through the Konekt Barangay Promo SIM
(c) Details of sending/receiving load
13. You will continue to enjoy your Konekt SIM card by ensuring that your SIM card is loaded.
The Konekt SIM card will expire if you fail to reload within 60 days from the initial activation
and use. The Konekt SIM card will also expire if you fail to load within 120 days after the
date you had a zero account balance. Once a SIM card expires, it is automatically deactivated
and the phone number cannot be used anymore.
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14. Since the network and services of the Konekt Promo service is powered by experimental
technology, Globe cannot ensure 24/7 operation and fast network restoration in the event
of typhoons, rains, earthquakes and other acts of God.
15. Globe will not be responsible for any service disruptions caused by any untoward incidents
like typhoons, earthquakes, re, terrorism, or force majeure.
Subscriber:
Name, Signature, Date
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Market good # observations # locations Units Min Max Mean SD
Banana 819 201 piece 0.33 25 10.47 3.73
Beef Brisket (fresh, raw) 317 102 piece 5 200 42.42 37.30
Beer 718 177 cl 0 1833.33 11.56 74.65
Bitter Ball 476 130 kg 0 475 74.28 53.98
Bitter Kola 823 192 piece 0.91 35 13.96 4.7
Boiled Eggs 891 206 piece 1 25 13.24 2.54
Bread 1002 202 piece 5 500 72.35 48.49
Bulgur Wheat 830 168 kg 0.03 3187.5 49.91 116.3
Butter Rice 886 183 kg 0.68 7437.5 85.2 353.04
Cassava 749 165 piece 0.11 100 15.12 9.12
Cassava Flour 979 203 kg 0 4250 57.45 228.58
Cassava Leaf 377 109 piece 8.33 100 18.90 14.07
Charcoal 807 193 kg 2.4 1190 17.25 59.93
Chloride 842 199 liter 0 2000 152 88.76
Fan-fan Rice 839 170 kg 1 4250 68.77 147.18
Fuel (Diesel) 569 164 liter 10.57 1733.33 100.95 111.06
Instant Coee 518 154 gram 0.01 10 2.72 2.63
Kidney Beans (dry) 805 175 kg 0.18 15937.5 203.45 869.62
Live Chicken (medium size) 361 81 piece 0 1300 615.95 244.02
Mayonnaise 613 168 ml 0.01 739.34 35.02 96.95
Onion 1098 214 piece 0.4 125 21.47 20.59
Orange 852 193 piece 2.5 125 16.57 11.29
Palm Butter 711 158 kg 3 2500 35.37 149.35
Palm Oil 997 198 liter 9.51 1800 110.71 80.40
Petrol (gas) 682 175 gallon 0.31 710 252.43 111.52
Plantain (Cooking Banana) 900 198 piece 0 250 20.37 11.26
Potato Greens 608 141 piece 0.5 35 14.2 4.74
Powdered Milk 846 197 gram 0 70 0.86 2.78
Salt 918 190 gram 0 4.25 0.09 0.23
Sardines (canned) 332 99 gram 0.04 4.25 1.55 1.53
Seasoning cube 434 108 gram 0 127.5 0.72 6.11
Smoked Fish 592 162 piece 0.52 550 70.24 81.93
Sugar 967 198 gram 0 8.75 0.12 0.54
Tomato 564 132 piece 0.08 500 22.07 33.62
USA Parboiled Rice 981 205 kg 5 6250 92.21 279.91
Vegetable Oil 1012 197 liter 1.35 580 130.4 41.09
Water (Bag) 1035 217 ml 0 5.71 0.02 0.18
Table A1: Summary statistics of Premise contributor data. Data collection in Liberia began
in October, 2014, with products and market locations being gradually added since then. Signicant
variation between products in data quality and quantity.
